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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis will argue that one of the main challenges Alevis experience in Turkey is the 
lack of adequate historical credit afforded to them within Modern Turkish society.   
Though Alevis have a much older history than the Republic of Turkey, having occupied 
the region for centuries before the inception the modern Turkish nation-state, they still 
have a very specific relationship with the development of the secular Kemalist-Turkish 
identity. In fact, Alevis began to develop a novel and unique political identity, which 
embraced secularism in spite of deeply rooted religious convictions, during Turkey's 
National transition from the late Ottoman Empire (early 1900s) to the early multi-party 
era (late 1950s).  
 
Existing scholarship on Alevi identity often exclusively focuses on how they were 
perceived as a religious group during the Ottoman Era or on their increasingly 
marginalized political identity after the 1970s. However, this thesis will argue that these 
approaches fail to appreciate the ‘transition period’ of Alevi identity, and how the 
transformation from being considered a strictly religious/ethnic identity within the 
Ottoman Empire to becoming viewed as vocal and political advocates of secularism 
from the early Republic is crucial to understanding contemporary Alevi identity. It will 
argue that past research has not paid enough attention to this transition, casting Alevi 
cultural and political identity as fragmented, rigid and impermeable rather than fluid and 
constantly evolving. 
 
To this end, this thesis will seek to demonstrate that Alevism has in fact evolved 
politically since the sixteenth century of the Ottoman Era, and validate why most Alevis 
became secular Kemalists during the early twentieth century Republican era of modern 
Turkey, with the Alevi identity maintaining a dedicated Kemalist ideology since then 
society at large. 
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Glossary 
Bektashi Group of people refer to a saint, Haci Bektas, who migrated from Central 
Asia to Anatolia starting from the eleventh century onwards. 
Cem  The most communal Alevi ritual performed by a dede. 
Cemevi A modern Turkish invention that represents a building that is used by urban 
Alevi followers where cem is celebrated and performed by the masses. 
Dede  The person, who represents a distinct posturing of the Alevi as being 
literally descended from the founders of Islam, while also fulfilling a more 
antiquated Anatolian folk-religious position of community spiritual leader, or 
shaman. Dedelik is an essential institution of the Alevi sect of Islam. 
Diyanet  The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. 
Icazetname Diploma. 
Imam Hatip Schools  School type that came under the control of the Republican 
Party in 1949 in order to train prayers and preachers. Graduates of these schools 
generally found employment in the mosques where they became paid government 
officials. 
Kemalism  An ideology referring to the state-led regime of modernization introduced 
at the beginning of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his 
supporters. As, such Kemalism represents a political ideology, that though aimed at 
modernization via liberal and secular reforms, still maintained a heavy autocratic 
regulation of Turkish national identity over the diverse ethnic and religious identities 
it sought to homogenize under its leadership. 
Millet   A word of Arabic origin which had come to mean a religious community 
in Turkish usage The Nationalists, later became the Committee of Union and 
Progress members (CUP), used to describe ‘nation’, ‘national’, and ‘nationalism’ 
were divided from millet. 
 7 
Sabbateans A religious/cultural group of so-called “crypto-Jews”, who are still 
practicing their ‘open-secret’ identity like their leader Shabbtai Tzvi, who was 
forced to convert to Islam from Judaism, but continued to practice Judaism privately 
while professing Islam in public. 
Semah  Alevi ritual dances. 
Shariah  The Muslim Legal code, founded on the Qur’an and hadith (traditions of 
the Prophet) and codified by various systems of interpretation. 
Seyyidlik  A form of leadership originating from the title of the seyyid, symbolizing 
males accepted as descendants of the Prophet Mohammad through his grandsons. 
Tanzimat  A new program of reform and reorganization according to Western views 
that issued as the Noble Rescript of Gülhane in November 1839. Tanzimat is 
essentially important because it gave way to the equality of the non-Muslims that 
was the initiator for the societal and cultural homogeneity for the nation-state 
process. 
Ulema (sing. al-Alim)  Literally ‘he who knows,’ but more specifically the 
scholars who were versed in the religious sciences and therefore authorized to 
interpret these sciences and especially the Shariah Law in Islam.   
Ummah (or Umma)  Literally means ‘nation’ a universal Islamic Community. 
Besides, it is the centerpiece concept in Qur’an, the worldwide community of Islam 
embraces all the Muslims from all over the world. The ‘loyalty to Umma’ is 
decisively inseparable from ‘loyalty to God’. Furthermore, Ummah puts the Muslim 
identity on top of any other different identity. 
Young Turks  A group of constitutionalists, exiled in France who founded a 
committee called Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress – 
CUP) and began publishing the journal Mesveret (Consultation) in 1895. The 
leading figure of this movement, Ahmad Rıza, was a radical secularist and 
positivist. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
On 29 May 2013, an important event took place in Istanbul: President Abdullah Gül and 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan named the third bridge on the Bosphorus after 
“Yavuz Sultan Selim”, in a ground-breaking ceremony for the construction of the bridge 
(Todays Zaman, 30 May 2013; Hurriyet Daily News, 29 May 2013; NTVMSNBC, 5 June 
2013).  
However, this news caused discomfort among the Alevis and their supporters. Yavuz 
Sultan Selim, a prominent figure as an Ottoman Sultan, is believed to have killed 
thousands of Alevis in Anatolia under his rule, specifically during the Battle of Chaldiran 
in 1514 against the Shah Ismail-led Safavid Dynasty (Sokefeld 2008, 42; Refik 1932; 
Ocak 1998, 94-95). The Deputy Leader, Hüseyin Aygün, of the main opposition party the 
Republican People’s Party, who himself is of Kurdish and Alevi origin, stated via his 
Twitter account “the fact that the name of the executioner of Alevis was given to the bridge 
is open bullying of Alevis” (Today’s Zaman, 30 May 2013). The head of the Cem 
Foundation1, İzzettin Doğan, also uncomfortable with this controversial political decision, 
said: “Yavuz Sultan Selim is an important political figure. He has been remembered for 
his deeds for centuries. But history also recorded his massacre of 70,000 Alevis. It is 
politically wrong to use the name of a person with this kind of record on a place where he 
will always be remembered” (Today’s Zaman, 30 May 2013).  
Despite critical questions that have been raised about the extent of massacres of Alevis by 
the Ottoman Empire happening during the rule of Yavuz Sultan Selim, there are still a  
number of sources that account for centuries of systematic oppression carried out by the 
Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the sixteenth century onwards (Bozarslan 2003, 
5; Kehl-Bodrogi 2003, 54). These acts of oppression came in the shape of mass arrests, 
deportation and also massacres. These oppressive episodes were not only limited to the 
                                                 
1 Cem Foundation is a foundation that established in April 1995 which defines itself as the essence 
organization of Alevism (Okan 2004, 137). Cem Foundation is one of the foremost important Alevi 
organizations up to now. 
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supporters of Shah Ismail and all other Shi’ite groups practicing within the empire, but 
also extended to other heterodox groups; particularly the Alevis, who as the biggest 
Anatolian heterodox community, were continuously affected (Sokefeld 2008, 42; Refik 
1932; Ocak 1998, 94-95).  
This contemporary naming of the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge shows that the Alevi 
community till faces problems of recognition in present-day Turkey. Based on this 
premise, it is important to analyze the development of the contemporary political identity 
of the Alevis, examining its roots specifically from the period of the Ottoman Empire (late 
sixteenth century through the early twentieth) up to the early-multi party era (of the late 
1950s) and explain how this history has influenced a particular modern and political 
identification for Alevis through their collective and communal response to the 
development of Kemalism. For this reason, this thesis will focus on the period between 
the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republican Era of the 1960s. 
A significant minority group within Turkey, the Alevis were one of a number of peoples 
under constant pressure from the respective rulers of Anatolia, i.e., Seljuks, Ottomans and 
the Republic of Turkey under the rule of the Republican People’s party, stretching back 
the eleventh century and continuing onwards to the present day. Because of this ruling 
pressure, the Alevis later became important defenders of Kemalist principles, which 
ideologically presented them with the ability to hope for a public space that afforded them 
protection from religious persecution under the protection of secularist policies, though in 
practice this was not always the case. This turn towards Kemalism also led the Alevis to 
become defenders or sometimes even the founders of various politically “progressive” and 
leftist groups in Turkey (Köse, 2012, 589). Within Turkey, Alevi support for the Young 
Turks, has been generally termed as “progressive” because of the will to modernize 
Turkey through the introduction of liberal social and secular religious reforms. This 
support for the Young Turks was heavy from both the Alevis and the Bektashis in parallel. 
The thesis will contrast this earlier support of the Young Turks against the subsequently 
more institutionalized attitude of the Kemalists towards the Alevis during the early 
Republican era; which likewise courted support from the Alevi community under the same 
appeal of furthering liberal social and secular national ideals. However, it should be noted 
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that this furtherance of liberal and secular reforms has historically been the result of heavy 
handed authoritarian means on the part of the Kemalist state, counter to the normal 
understanding of “progressive” political situations in the West. 
It should also be stressed, that though the contemporary Alevi community is seen as being 
historically aligned with Kemalist ideology, it is not a natural feature of Alevism to align 
with Kemalist politics. Rather, the Kemalist turn in contemporary Alevi political 
affiliation was born out of a complex merging of internal-existential interests facing the 
community itself, and external-propaganda and institutional regulations brought on by the 
Kemalist control of the Turkish Republic after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This 
political turn via the institutional political and social challenges that spurned it, occurring 
between a history of marginalized pressure and political resistance, will be analyzed 
deeper in the third chapter. In the third chapter, further light will be shed on a number of 
historical occasions that determined the result of a “progressive” political identification 
for the Alevis; i.e support for the progressive Young Turks, determined as such because 
of their will to modernize Turkey by introducing liberal social and secular religious 
reforms,. 
In this context, it will be argued that political incidents in the modern era left no option 
for Alevis but to support the Kemalist Republican People’s party. Given that Alevis have 
almost always supported political parties that promoted secularism, starting with the 
Republican People’s Party, it is significant to question why this has been the case despite 
the fact that none of these parties, including the Republican People’s Party, have managed 
to identify the problems affecting the Alevis, both as a religious and ethnic group, up to 
now.  
The Alevis, having centuries long history of development as a distinct ethnic group, 
represent a significant minority within contemporary Turkey. The formation of Alevism 
as a sect began in the eleventh century and continued onwards, taking place under the 
shadow of a long period of oppression against the Alevis, by Seljuks, Ottomans and later 
the early Republic of Turkey. Even though the actual number of Alevis is not presently 
known, due to the nonexistence of reliable data on the ethnic and religious backgrounds 
of Turkish citizens, the Alevi population is predicted to be between 10 to 20 million 
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(Schuler 2002, 171-172; Kehl-Bodrogi 1988, 93; Vorhoff  1995, 58; Köse 2012, 576-577; 
Tambar 2012, 653). 
In addition to the sizable minority population the Alevis represent, the Alevis also 
originated from Central Asia, and were considered vital for the new nation-building 
project of the Kemalists. The Alevis were seen as both given to the modernizing politics 
and new national character of the Kemalists wished to instill. The Alevis had their own 
distinct and authentic folklore which stood in contrast and at times even in opposition to 
the traditions of the Ottoman past. The Kemalists reasoned that this Alevis folklore would 
help build a new post-Ottoman sense of Turkishness in Anatolia, especially because the 
majority population had been dominated by Sunni-Islamic elements through centuries-
long Ottoman rule. The Kemalist regime sought to displace a perceived Ottoman 
adherence to Sunni social norms, by delegitimizing its historical hold on the Turkish 
geography of Anatolia. The Alevis hope in this Kemalist utilization of their folk-culture, 
belonged to the appealing chance of a more inclusive history of the diverse religious life 
found in Turkey, especially with Islamic sects that were marginalized by the Sunni 
emphasis of the Ottoman Empire, would take hold in the new Republic, allowing for a 
more tolerant secular political culture. Nonetheless, shortly after the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey, the Kemalist secular laicism ideology failed to create the necessary 
neutral conditions promised for the Alevis; which would have allowed them to represent 
themselves within the political as well as in the social arena without fear of further 
oppression. This was due mostly to the fact that Kemalist ideology still held a 
homogenized vision of Turkishness as its end goal for social integration of the diverse 
religious and ethnic groups throughout Anatolia. The Alevi were then seen as a symbolic 
tool to be deployed towards a new mythic “origin” for Turkish identity, and not regarded 
as deserving recognition as a distinct autonomous identity within the new Republic. The 
Kemalists in effect wished to use Alevism, amongst other folk and marginalized 
communities in Anatolia, to reconstruct a history for a future Turkishness; which the Alevi 
would have to adopt at the expense of their Alevi identity. 
This view has been supported in more recent literature on the topic. For example Markus 
Dressler’s book “Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam” has highlighted 
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the commissioned Kemalist historiographical attempts to define Alevism, in ways that 
assimilate the ethnic/religious group into an explicit homogenous national identity. 
(Dressler 2013, 153-186) There has also been work by Christopher Houston on how 
Kemalism interacted with parallel ethnic identities, such as the Kurds (who overlap at 
times with the Alevi, as will be explained in chapter 3), and the various identity politics 
that oppressed them in the name of a more unified Turkish national character (Houston 
2008, 97-138). This thesis however, is more concerned with exploring the historical and 
ongoing reception of Kemalist ideology directly by the Alevi community. The history of 
Kemalist appropriation of marginal ethnic identities within Anatolia; its policies, 
commissioned historiographies and the deeper underlying intentions of utilizing them 
towards a “new” Turkish identity are important to note and keep in mind. However, this 
thesis is more concerned with the Alevi response to Kemalist ideology, the hopes and 
desires for recognition and security that Kemalist populist propaganda inspired, rather 
than an historical account of how the ideology operated in the service of a larger focus of 
identity politics in general under Kemalist rule. A case for revisionism of Kemalist history 
is certainly in order, as its framing of both the Alevi, other marginal ethnicities, and even 
their Ottoman predecessors, is clearly in need of contesting. Still, this particular focus 
would be too much of a divergence and distraction, given the focused attention of this 
thesis, from giving a sense to how it is that the Alevi, in a popular sense, received, 
internalized and resisted various Kemalist policies and reforms. In a future work, where 
more space and a larger scope of research can be brought together, it would be advisable 
to incorporate the historical Kemalist construction of the Alevi, through Kemalist political 
dialogue and commissioned academic research, into a larger argument about the limited 
recognition of the Alevi culture afforded by the Kemalist regime.   
However, in the view of the Alevi, the Kemalist principles of laicism, as an effort to put 
Western style modernist reforms into action, were not fully capable of restricting the role 
of the Sunni religion in the new republic. This spurned a major shift in how the Alevi 
responded to the hope of recognition under Kemalist policy. Whilst the Kemalist state 
tried to rid itself of the main Sunni-Islamic elements that were highly infused into Turkish 
politics, owing to centuries of strong Ottoman rule via the office of the Caliphate and the 
Ministry of Shariah Affairs, the replacement of the latter with the a similarly influential 
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institution, the Diyanet, showed that Kemalist policies did not go beyond promoting Sunni 
Islam as the de facto official religion of the new state (Sokefeld 2008). Still, this situation 
did not prevent Alevis from secularly adopting the Kemalist ideology. From the Alevi 
point of view, a weak secularism was still better than religious rule intolerant to 
heterodoxy. Moreover, secularist tendencies among contemporary Alevis should also be 
seen as a symptom of the larger turn of the Alevis away from their more religious 
identification in the past. During this period of government imposed secularism, the Alevis 
responded by moving away from their belief system as the main signifier of their identity 
and embracing their wider Alevi culture. As a result their communal traditions and 
expectation were reshaped and interiorized by Kemalist laicism, becoming more 
politically active in the project of modernism under Kemalist ideology (Köse 2012). 
Therefore, the Alevis in the early Republican Era found themselves in a transition, being 
less attached to the religious interpretations of Alevism, and instead more attached to a 
cultural and folk identification under the promised secular freedoms of Kemalism 
(İçduygu & Keyman 1998-9; Parla & Davidson 2004; Karasipahi 2009). 
Furthermore, even though Alevi groups were aware of the weakness of Kemalist ideology 
from its early periods, they nevertheless remained staunch defenders of Kemalism. Even 
today, the majority of Alevis are still faithful to this newly crafted Turkishness designed 
by the Kemalists with the help of the reform of authentic Alevi traditions (Okan 2004, 
124). However, this reality could not change the fact that Alevi communities began to 
rediscover their suppressed identity and articulate a historical narrative which stretches 
far back into the past and does not necessarily end in a generic Turkish national character. 
They have developed a political sensibility that is staunchly nationalist in its ethos, while 
also maintaining that the “national” is heterogeneous in character as well. Essentially, the 
Alevis have emerged as significant political actors in urban and public places in recent 
decades; particularly after the sectarian violence that they were exposed to in the late 
1970s. This violent period, along with Alevi migration to the big cities, has resulted in 
their rapid politicization (Tambar 2012, 653). 
Under Kemalist rule, the biggest ignorance of the Alevis came with the non-
acknowledgment of the Alevi population being a distinct and autonomous identity. By not 
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recognizing any difference afforded by religion or regional and ethnic customs, in order 
to create a Turkish nationalist identity, the Kemalist regime failed to end state sponsored 
religious division and repressive policies that sought to homogenize the Turkish identity. 
Ultimately, to these ends, the Kemalist regime succumbed to the need of propping up a 
Sunni religious institution to replace the Ottoman caliphate – which the regime 
accomplished through the Diyanet. Because of this, the early Republican regime remained 
indifferent to the existence of Alevis in their official accounts –much like their Ottoman 
ancestors - in order to maintain control of a unified Turkish national identity and character. 
This situation, along with centuries-long suppression, emphasized that the identities of 
Alevis were written and designed either by the current hegemonic power according to its 
socio-political interests, or in line with the Alevis’ relation to other identities; such as, 
citizens of the Republic of Turkey, Kurds etc. (Sokefeld 2008, 21). This suppression, 
particularly the lack of recognition of an Alevi identity, kept them from forming their own 
political identity in the early Republic, up until the later identity movements in the Turkish 
politics of 1970s (Sokefeld 2008, 32). Therefore, specific rituals and cultural practices 
remained as the key determinants and the key factors in the maintenance of an Alevi 
identity through this period, despite the fact that these fundamental features were re-
contextualized by those in power at the time in service of a project of translating them into 
a newly defined Turkish identity (Köse 2012, 576). 
With the identity movements of the 1970s in Turkey, the Alevis became a big part of the 
ongoing process of identity transformation; this was due to the modernization and 
urbanization that they subsequently underwent (Köse 2012, 576). This transformation of 
Alevis should be seen as a part of the transformation that all migrants from rural areas to 
big cities underwent, particularly through the urban branches of strong political party 
structures (Schuler 2002, 288). Even though there were conflicts with Turkish laicism in 
regards to the Alevi, and a subsequent recognition of politics that was triggered under 
these circumstances, we still cannot discuss a genuine Alevi identity movement. The Alevi 
identity movement was markedly different when referenced to other similar movements 
at the time, both in terms of religious and ethnic actors, such as Islamist and Kurdish 
movements. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the development of an Alevi identity through 
rural-urban migration, occurring around other major identity movements, was interrupted 
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by direct sectarian violence due to the political polarization between left and right political 
wings (Hiç 2009, 23, 30; Tambar 2012, 653; Massicard 2007, 58). This situation later 
reflected itself in the form of an increasing socialist ideology, which identified itself as 
the connecting core of the Alevi's political identities, and also caused the Alevis to 
abandon the centricity of their previously religiously and/or ethnically defined identity 
(Çamuroğlu 1998, 79; Köse 2012, 593; Massicard 2007, 60-61).  
Nevertheless, this focus of change in the definition of Alevi identity was not launched 
until after the 1970s. This major transformation of Alevis from having no clear politics of 
identity to beginning to have one, and how it was initially largely enforced by the laic 
Kemalists, is important to examine for three main reasons. Firstly, there is a need to 
rethink existing political, historical, sociological and ethnographic literature on the topic, 
because much of it focuses too heavily on either the earlier pre-Republican understandings 
of Alevism as a religious group, or on the later post-Republican developments of Alevism 
as a distinct political entity (Massicard 2003; Sokefeld 2008; Tambar 2012; Vorhoff 
1999). What is then needed is a renewed focus on the history of this transition, and the 
expanding of that particular period that moved the historical understanding of the Alevis 
from a marginalized religious group to the embodiment of the Alevis as a figure within 
the new Turkishness; which Kemalism had sought to inaugurate within Turkey. In order 
for this to be done, this thesis will necessarily need to focus on material from across a 
variety of disciplinary sources. Secondly, the limited literature on Alevis also brings about 
the necessity of a synthesis in the aforementioned areas in two ways. The current literature 
tends to neglect the political aspect of the Alevi identity in relation to the early Kemalist 
period; and moreover, the literature either focuses solely on the cultural dynamics of the 
community or examines the Alevi communities in relation to other identities such as 
Bektashis (Tambar 2012, 653).Thirdly, literature overlooking the intra-ethnic differences 
between Kurdish and Turkish Alevis is prevalent due to the long-lasting tension between 
the majority of the Kurdish citizens and the Turkish government that still stands to this 
day (Köse 2012; van Bruinessen 2013; Melikoff 1998). 
The initial problematic in relation to understanding the Alevi social and political 
standpoint emerges from the lack of and ineffective use of literature. The political and 
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historical underpinning of the majority of available literature concerning the Alevis poses 
a challenge when sourcing information on the Alevis’ socio-political behavior. The 
increase in publications on the Alevis in the last two decades have mostly been in Turkish, 
English, German and French; and considering the number of publications in Turkish, only 
a small number of them are reliable. As such, the scarcity of available sources on Alevi 
political history has led to reliance on a comparatively limited number of key sources 
throughout this study. 
As a background to the Alevi faith, rituals and practices, even though this is the area to 
which the most attention is paid, three works provide crucial insight into the philosophy, 
rituals and practices of Alevis. These are: Murat Okan’s Türkiye’de Alevilik: Antropolojik 
Bir Yaklaşım (2004), Irene Melikoff’s Bektashi / Kizilbas: Historical Bipartition and Its 
Consequences and Talha Köse’s, Ideological or religious? Contending visions on the 
future of Alevi identity? (2012). These three authors have made use of primary sources 
(Ottoman and Republic of Turkey archives on political history) as well as secondary 
sources to offer an insight into the Alevis’(religious, ethnic and ideological identity 
tendencies in relation to political incidents. The three sources are written primarily to 
enlighten the politicization processes that the Alevis went through, focusing particularly 
on the period from the 1970s onwards. Even though these sources only emphasize the last 
four decades, they are all well-versed in terms of highlighting the essential background 
that this thesis will rely on. The work of Okan will aid the thesis arguments to a great 
extent, as his work looks in detail at early Alevism and how it was conceptually formed - 
including historically within Anatolia. 
Martin van Bruinessen’s book Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik 
Mücadeleleri (2013) is a valuable account, as it covers the heavily overlooked topic of 
intra-ethnic differences of Turkish and Kurdish Alevis respectively2. The study surveys 
the ethnic identity differentiation as well as formation between Turkish and Kurdish 
                                                 
2 Since this thesis is focusing specifically on the identity transformation of Alevis during the transition 
between Ottoman to Republican rule of Turkey, the term ‘Kurdish Alevis’ will be used for the population 
who either speaks Zaza or Kirmanci (dialectics the Kurdish Language spoken within Turkey) regardless if 
they grasp the Kurdish identity or not; which in itself is indicative of another identity politics in the 
Modern era of Turkey as a nation-state.    
 17 
Alevis from political, historical and sociological perspectives. This source is also 
significant in understanding the evolution of Kurdish ethnicity and it chronicles how the 
ethnic differences have evolved starting from the early Ottoman era in Anatolia to present 
day. In addition, due to the intensive stress that it puts on the faith, principles and traditions 
of the Alevis, this book is an essential source for this thesis. 
Elise Massicard has written at length on the Alevis, covering their history of identity 
formation and politicization in her book, Alevi Hareketinin Siyasallaşması (2007). 
Employed in this thesis, this book, though focused on the multi-party era from the Alevi 
identity movements’ development point of view in relation to Kemalism, also offers an 
extensive account to the emergence of Alevi communities. She offers the reader an insight 
into the history of the Alevis, from the Ottoman Empire to the present decade, using 
centuries-long sociological observations. Therefore, this source is very important and 
unique in the field, as well as for this work. 
Harald Schuler’s book Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi: Particilik, Hemşehrilik, Alevilik 
(2002) is a masterpiece in providing insight into this sparsely covered topic, and how 
social democracy progressed in relation to partisanship, citizenship and Alevis. This 
source is a valuable account as it essentially depicts the quantitative data and analysis that 
has been used to bring about an investigation in early Republican era party structures’ and 
party membership’s impact on the later periods in the country. This book is also important 
to this study due to the special attention that it gives to the politicization tendencies of the 
Alevis and how that has develops over time. 
In order to provide an understanding of the Alevi identity from historiographical, 
ethnographic and sociological points of views, Karin Vorhoff’s Türkiye’de Alevilik ve 
Bektaşilikle İlgili Akademik ve Gazetecilik Nitelikli Yayınlar (1997) and Faruk Bilici’s 
Alevi-Bektaşi İlahiyatının Günümüz Türkiye’sindeki İşlevi (1999) are crucial articles. 
Even though both sources necessitate further extended studies, they provide broad analysis 
on the areas that they examined respectively: literature review on the sources of Alevism 
and Bektashis, and the functionality of Alevi-Bektashi theology in today’s Turkey. 
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This thesis aims then to validate how this sectarian minority known as Alevi evolved 
politically from the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire forward, and why most Alevis 
became Kemalists during the early Republican era of modern Turkey, with only a few 
abandoning Kemalism since then. It will try to explicate the historical, sociological and 
political dynamics found especially in the late Ottoman Era and Early Republican period, 
which consolidated Alevism as identical with a Kemalist (and to a lesser extent Leftist) 
identity. Before the Republican Party, whose roots are found in the Young Turks’ 
ideology, we cannot really talk about a politically identifiable Alevi identity. Put 
differently, this study is mainly interested in the historical, political and social dynamics 
at play throughout the Alevis' history in Turkey; especially during the late 19th and 20th 
century when the Alevis' political identity was mainly shaped. Focusing on how this 
shaping rendered their cultural identity as an isolated and unique one, as well as figuring 
them as being at odds with orthodox Islam, highlighting how the cultural-historical roots 
of the community are inherently constituted along marginal social and political lines. It is 
important to note as well that this thesis will be primarily be concerned with exploring 
this expression of a “politicized” Alevi culture from works that are explicitly concerned 
with giving shape to the Alevi reception of its identification within various political 
regimes. What is of import to the history that is presented here then is how certain political 
discourses, policies and formations, regardless of their actual intent or veracity, impacted 
the Alevi in their own response and organization of a distinct political identity. 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter, in the initial section, serves 
primarily as an introduction. In the second section, the thesis turns to examine the 
historiography of Alevis development from the Ottoman Empire to the Republican era. 
Looking at this historiography is necessary to highlight the difficulties of locating an Alevi 
identity, primarily because it is precisely in the context of competing histories written by 
non-Alevi political powers that gave birth to an Alevi designation as a specific ethnicity 
in the first place. 
Chapter Two will be devoted to understanding the specific terms that will be widely used 
throughout the study: the Alevi, Bektashi, Kizilbas, Kemalism, laicism and secularism. 
Here, the paper will provide insight for the reader about these key terms in order to 
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diminish the possibility ambiguities that might occur. In the second part of the chapter the 
study will highlight Alevi identity as a religion and Alevism as an ethnicity, which will be 
further touched upon in the following chapters; particularly through the lens of the 
formation of Alevi identity and how it re-positioned and politicized itself from its religious 
and ethnic origins. 
Chapter Three will examine Alevi politicization and socialization processes from the late 
Ottoman period to the Turkish multi-party period. To examine the reproduction of Alevi 
identity and the extent to which Alevism was used and reinvented by the dominant 
political powers they have existed under. In this chapter, three sections will be presented. 
First, although focus will be given particularly to the last period of the Ottoman Empire 
under the Young Turks’ rule relying on Alevi historiography, the Safavid Dynasty’s 
religious, sociological and political effect on the Alevis will also be evaluated. Since the 
very terms of recognition of identity depend on the discourse of identity, Alevism’s 
relation to Shi’ism through the Safavid Dynasty, when the Ottoman archives take them 
into consideration, should be seen as the start of the invention of the Alevi identity in 
Anatolia. Up until the sixteenth century, there existed no recognized sectarian religious 
group known as Alevi in the records of the Empire, and only after the 16th century did 
they come to be known as the Alevis (Çamuroğlu 1998, 83). Along with the results of the 
Battle of Chaldiran, instead of putting an end to the suppression of Ottoman over Shi’ite 
affiliated groups, including Alevis, the defeat of the Safavid Dynasty gave birth to an 
intolerant environment for such groups. In this regard, this thesis will question the extent 
to which the Safavids had an impact on the Alevi communities’ traditions and rituals, 
which were subsequently later used by the reformist Young Turks. 
In the second section, an examination of the early Republican era of Turkey under the rule 
of the Republican People’s Party will take place within three subcategories. As 
aforementioned, how Kemalist nation-building reinvented and distributed Alevi identity 
as part of a new Turkishness within the new Turkey. On this point, the first subcategory, 
after the detailed outline given about the conditions of the new State, will focus on the 
role that was attributed to the Alevis for nation building. In this respect, the thesis will 
present how and why the Alevis were chosen by the Kemalists and it will also present the 
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reactions of Alevis as the actors of this critical Kemalist aim – especially after the Closure 
of Religious Convents and Dervish Lodges in November of 1925, which had a remarkably 
adverse effect on the Alevis. In addition, the intra-ethnic differences that have gained 
significance since the 1970s among Turkish and Kurdish Alevis as early as the Seyh Said 
rebellion will be examined. The similarities and dissimilarities between Turkish Alevis 
and Kurdish Alevis will also be discussed; the Kurdish problem has become a significant 
issue for the Republic of Turkey even to present day. For this purpose, the Seyh Said 
rebellion will essentially be used as a case study. In the second subcategory, one of the 
main Kemalist reforms, the abolishment of the Caliphate will be examined, and in the 
following subcategory another critical Kemalist reform, the Diyanet, will be presented. 
Along with the analysis of these two subcategories, a discussion will follow about how 
these reforms, whether indirectly or not, have influenced the Alevi communities. In doing 
so, it will emphasize the de facto state religion status of Sunni Islam through the Diyanet, 
even though the suppression of heretics changed its direction particularly to the radical 
Sunnis. This was due to strict control over religion via the Diyanet and the abolishment of 
the Caliphate office. 
Chapter Four will emphasize the changes in political tendency among Alevis, starting 
from the period of multi-party politics. In this regard, the chapter will examine the 
emergence and formation of the party structure and partisanship before it moves on to 
analyze the Democratic Party's effect, by giving less attention to other political parties 
founded during that period; this includes the National Development Party and National 
Party. Special attention will be given to the Democratic Party mainly because it was the 
first successful political party formed which initiated the period as a multi-party period. 
While this part will offer a historical background for the aforementioned cases, the 
struggle between ideological identity and political identity in the Alevi communities will 
be reviewed particularly in relation to the disagreements that they have developed towards 
the Republican People’s Party. The last part of Chapter Four will examine where the 
Alevis fit, as well as where they situate themselves, within the structure of the Turkish 
political system, particularly after the 1957 Election of Turkey. 
Chapter Five concludes the arguments of the thesis as discussed in the preceding chapters. 
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1.2. Alevis and Historiography 
Those who tell the stories also rule society. Plato –Republic 
Looking at a historiography regarding Alevis is crucial to emphasize the difficulties of 
locating an Alevi identity. Particularly because it is precisely in the context of competing 
histories written by non-Alevi powers, which brought about Alevi as an ethnicity in the 
first place, it is significant to considering Alevi historiography. As such, the various 
powers that have brought the task forward of “identifying” the Alevi, and placing them in 
an official historical context, have left accounts that are wanting in objective focus. This 
following section will look to criticize the “official” view of Alevi identity, from the larger 
critique of historiography in the service of State homogenization. However, this critique 
is not the end goal of the section. Rather, it will also introduce an opening into research 
that seeks to orientate an approach to Alevi identity and history from the view of the Alevi 
community itself, as opposed to further developing a critical view of official historical 
accounts brought to bear upon the community. 
History has begun to be seen as a hegemonic product, a tool that can shape personal 
memories and a mechanism that generates official biases in and through archives. In this 
regard, it is impossible to ignore the effect of the Western world in its historigraphic 
methodological process and the concept of modernity for historical understanding, even 
though modernity's concerns for history gave birth to a highly fertile environment that 
consciously created ambiguity for the relationship between history and archive.  
When the structure of power is considered, it is not hard to see that power acts as if it 
should have been exercised in and through whichever way it necessitates. Military powers, 
economic powers, as well as political powers are the ways in which authority shows its 
accountability to what it dominates. In this regard, history is the absolute way to interfere 
in any source of power, so as to ensure that the archives appear as a result of being exactly 
in the same category with the history for the hegemons. Modernity requires archives and 
archives are legitimated and interpreted in order to be used to push and pull whenever the 
powerful hegemon is in need of change and support. Power not only creates archives, but 
is also fed by them. History is equal to the archives by reason of the understanding of 
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modernity; power will reproduce itself over and over in time with similar changes within 
the archives it indexes. 
The understanding of modernity has a strong correlation with the history for the new 
world. The nation-state is one of the most important factors in the process of defining 
history. To state the matter differently, history is seen as a requirement particularly for the 
oppressed ones on their way to freedom. However, the oppressed ones’ struggle would 
always remain far from being enough to be fully purified from the hegemon’s rule and 
influence, and the nationality discourse that the hegemon powers created in the name of 
modernity might not in fact be applicable for the oppressed (Dirks 1990, 25-26). It is also 
arguable that the tradition of the oppressed is highly affected by the hegemonic world, by 
gaining a new meaning of the concept of the modernity of hegemons even though 
modernity itself depends upon tradition. Thus, in any case, history became the hegemon’s 
history and not the history of the oppressed. 
The making of history is inseparable then from archives in today’s understanding. Thus, 
while the number of the interpretations of history is variable, who always wins is the 
archive creator (Stoler 2002, 89). Our perceptions are under attack from so-called modern 
history producers as well as our own roles in the process of making our own history and 
memory. History, in its hegemonic and modern iteration, depends on archives that 
facilitate and develop it as such. 
An archive is not an institution, but “the law of what can be said,” not a library of events, 
but “that system that establishes statements as events and things,” that “system of their 
enunciabilities” (Foucault qtd. in Stoler 2002, 94). The Turkish Historical Society was 
established shortly after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 by the new 
Kemalist government. With this new institution, even though the new country placed an 
emphasis on territoriality as a nationality basis, they also aimed to create a new Turkish 
identity other than what the constitution had drawn up. The creation of archives was thus 
necessary to house legitimate and official works of history. As a result, archives were 
produced or reproduced first. The Turkish Historical Society produced a history through 
the archives in order to offer a new Turkishness that did not correlate to Ottomans, nor 
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that correlated to the many minority groups who could not be corroborated by reliable 
sources.  
History is a story about power, a story about those who won (Trouillot 1995, 5). In the 
case of modern Turkey, the early Republican government was the winner; it offered a new 
history of the Turk. While doing so, this new government did not acknowledge ethnic or 
religious minorities; it only emphasized the new idea of Turkishness. Derrida’s saying, no 
political power without control of the archive supports the previous argument and also 
underlines the significant role of the archives in the path of being powerful (Derrida qtd. 
in Stoler 2002, 92). For this purpose, it would be wrong to say that Alevi folklore began 
to be used as a political apparatus within archives with the establishment of the Republic 
of Turkey; the Alevis were also used as a tool whose lived tradition was ignored, 
misunderstood and reproduced according to the archival process of the Kemalist modern 
nationalism project.  
The history of the Alevis is a highly institutionalized one, stretching from the time of the 
Seljuks and Ottomans to the current day. Due to a long lasting misrecognition of the Alevi 
community, aside from early pejorative attributes found in Ottoman archives, extended 
Alevi historical writing only goes back to the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish 
Republic (Massicard 2003, 43; Sokefeld 2008, 35; Tambar 2012, 658). The Alevis were 
accounted for in the archives of the Ottoman Empire mainly from the sixteenth century 
onwards with different connotations. In Ottoman documents, Kizilbas was the term used 
to describe the Alevis until the nineteenth century, with words such as heretic, schismatic, 
Shi’ite and atheist also used; without specifying who the Kizilbas really were (Melikoff 
1998, 5-6). Though mentioned from the twentieth century onwards, destructive 
stereotypes ascribed to the Alevis have not been in use as frequently as before, due to the 
Young Turk’s positive interest in Alevis for their own reform movements. But it is still in 
effect and some works of Sunni literature still picture the Alevis as an innocent and naïve 
people who deviated from the right path due to the unpleasant conditions that they were 
subjected to (Vorhoff 1999, 44-45). As there is no escape from being subjected to the 
history that the hegemonic powers have written, this situation affects the present and 
future accordingly. In other words, since the Alevis have failed to have a clear record of 
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their lived history passed into the archives of the powers that rule them, modernity is then 
a failure too at its history-making, showing vividly in the case of Kemalist's Alevi 
historiography in the service of their modernization efforts (Dirks 1990). 
Fuat Köprülü, the head and the founder of the Institute of Turkic Studies at the time of the 
new Republic, gave birth to first academic writings on the Alevis during the last decade 
of the Ottoman Empire (Vorhoff 1999, 37; Massicard 2003, 43). Furthermore, in his 
Committee of Union and Progress, Baha Sait supported the research that emphasized the 
Turkish-Alevi communities. Sait claimed that the goal of the Turkish-Alevi communities 
had always been to protect the ‘real’ Turkish language, ethnicity and blood (Sait 1994, 
22).  
By not being any different than their Young Turk ancestors, Kemalists approached Alevi 
folklore as a source that could be interpreted as the reflection of the required essentials 
that the new state’s nationalist project demanded. The Kemalists enlisted the assistance of 
the Turkish Historical Society in order to do this, while the Ottoman Young Turks 
similarly employed the Institute of Turkic Studies (Tambar 2012, 658). 
However, the history that has been created by the powerful does not reflect authenticity; 
because even through the victory of establishing a novel and free nation-state, the history 
written from the previous hegemons of the land continued to affect it in and through its 
use of archives towards political rather than objective academic or scientific ends (Dirks 
1990; Stoler 2002). Particularly, the control over collective memory, the teaching of 
historical memory, and the national project of teaching historical memory are themes that 
were put into practice by Ottoman rule for centuries and again later by the Kemalists, who 
likewise also guaranteed the long-lasting misrecognition of the identity of Alevis in the 
Republic of Turkey (Oglesby 2007, 83). 
The attempt to produce more objective academic sources in relation to the Alevis has 
developed in recent decades. Mainly after the sectarian violence directed against their 
community in the late 1970s Alevi intellectuals began to publish works on Alevis. In other 
words, for the first time, the Alevis began to write their own history and have it archived 
in the public sphere. From then on, Alevi historiography has gained greater legitimacy 
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and officialdom when compared to the Alevi history that was written by the preceding 
dominating powers (Tambar 2012, 658-659; Vorhoff 1999, 34). Re-reading archives is a 
daunting affair in the Alevi case due the fact that Alevi history was written by various 
hegemon powers for various reasons of political expediency rather than objective 
knowledge. However, the re-reading of these archives still remains helpful to a certain 
extent for those in search of Alevi history. The archived data still shows a certain idea 
about how ‘the others’, the dominants, perceived the Alevis in the case of the studies 
presented by Köprülü and Sait. Nonetheless, the perception of others in the case of writing 
the history of a highly neglected as well as suppressed community brings about another 
outcome that is a further obstacle in front of an accomplished rewritten Alevi-history: the 
re-victimizing effect that the process of history writing brings about with its production.  
In the process of history-making for a community, despite each occasion being unique, 
re-victimization plays a significant role, especially if violence is a crucial part of the 
historical account (Gur-Ze’ev & Pappé 2003, 93). Unsurprisingly, the Alevis were the 
ones who were significantly affected by re-victimization in their history writing due to 
their collective memory of traumatic incidents3 that have impacted on them over the 
centuries (Massicard 2007, 85). The history of the Alevis is also a distinctive case in terms 
of revalidating its history as a community not only through long running issues such as 
unrecognized identities, but also through its daily dose of victimhood brought about by 
the history of an unrecognized identity itself. The objections raised through opposition to 
the naming of the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge are an important example in this respect.  
In this position, oral history has come into prominence in such a way that it would be the 
only way for the Alevis to rediscover their past through a more valid means, given how 
heavily developed Alevi folklore was around oral traditions. However, the suppression of 
Alevis affected the accountability of the information that could be gained from oral 
history, because the suppression lasted centuries and disrupted the possibility of clear 
transmission greatly. In the following part, this thesis will point out why the methodology 
                                                 
3 Sixteenth century Alevi massacre of Yavuz Sultan Selim, 1937-1938 Dersim Massacre, 1978 Maraş 
Massacre, 1993 Sivas Massacre, 1995 Gazi Incident (Sokefeld 2008, 42; Ocak 2004, 135; Refik 1932; 
Ocak 1998, 94-95; Massicard 2007, 85). 
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of oral history particularly in relation to re-victimization cannot help us understand the era 
that this dissertation aims to research. Although it is important to point out that this 
victimization was efficient in moving the Alevis to adopt secular power as an ideology, 
because it appeared as an equally opposed power to Sunni Islam. 
Oral history provides history at large with its sources for understanding social meaning, 
which is not presented in written, formal, political history. However, social history is 
interested in meaning and formation of memory instead of event based, sequential, linear 
understanding of history. Hence, the formation of memory as mediation between present 
and past plays a crucial role in understanding the social meaning of historical events. A 
single dimension that represents the truth or reality does not contribute to its formation 
but it is contributed to by a different organization of memory, which provides meaning for 
past events from the viewpoint of the present. This way, oral sources do not produce static, 
unchangeable and direct understandings of the events; however, they do present us with a 
changing, transformational and contingent perspective on the past (Portelli 1991). Since 
the history of the Alevis has been constructed using traumatic collective memories, 
historiography containing the recent past can only be fed by oral history as a 
complementary source; not like the incidents that had taken place hundred years ago. On 
most occasions, these would only cause re-victimization and self-realization over the 
victimhood. 
Furthermore, oral history forces different historicities to confront themselves and also 
proposes an alternative formal dimension. The different modes of selections and 
representations by shifting chronologies and spaces can be realized in oral sources. The 
mode of selection presents us with different echoes of the event; the personal, collective 
and political. The different modes of selection make us notice that as varied interests and 
motivations tell the history, the event itself is converted into a multi-formed historical 
instrument in memories (Portelli 1991). 
“... practice in which pasts that clash with official ways of explaining nation, 
community, and identity are arrested, in the multiple senses of being held 
back and, thus, delaying progress but also, in the ironic sense, of drawing 
attention to these pasts ….Historical arrest is not a permanent ban and times 
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are anticipated –although not guaranteed- in the future when these histories 
will be opened for discussion … Arrest is not just for written histories, but 
also for the many and varied forms that history may take and the ways that 
histories are unmade as well as made and made sense of”. (McGranahan 
2005, 575) 
Consequently, the Alevi’s arrested historiography from the sixteenth century onwards is 
currently seen as unfortunate, as rewriting the history of centuries is unlikely to be seen 
as a valid process. One reason is that oral history makes sense to historical events that 
occurred in the recent past by reconstructing them in present (Portelli 1991). On the other 
hand, the Europeans mainly produce literature on the Alevis; thus, even if European-
written literature on the Alevis has greater validity than previous literature, the language 
barrier makes it harder for the Alevis wanting to rediscover their histories as most of the 
studies are published in non-Turkish languages (Vorhoff 1999, 55). 
Because of the volatile nature of oral histories and the inherent lack of objectivity in the 
narrative voices that take it up, this study will focus primarily on providing a synthesis 
culled from a number of sources published in English, German and French; particularly 
those published before the 1980s. Also, in order to avoid the trapping of reproducing a 
history of the Alevis without giving ear to the Alevis themselves, a survey of Turkish 
language Alevis sources as well; especially those that began being published in the 1990s, 
after many Alevis intellectuals turned away from the precedent of oral history and took 
on the task of developing a history in a more formal academic context. 
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Chapter II. Definitions and Alevi Identity 
2.1. Definitions 
2.1.1. Alevi, Bektashi, Kizilbas 
Despite the intention to thoroughly examine Alevism in the following section, it is 
significant to describe the two most Alevism-engaged phenomena that will be recalled 
throughout the thesis: Bektashi and Kizilbas. Due to having no clear difference between 
the Alevis, Bektashis and Kizilbas, it is important to evaluate the extent of their relation 
in relation to one another.  
The Bektashis and the Alevis or the former Kizilbas all refer to a well-known saint, Haci 
Bektas. These groups migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia during Seljuk during the 
eleventh century onwards, and were part of a larger group of migrants collectively known 
as the Turkmen tribes (van Bruinessen 2013, 95; Melikoff 1998, 2).  A charismatic and 
legendary figure, Haci Bektas, also a Turkish Dervish, was one of the Turkmens who came 
to Anatolia around 1230s.  
Haci Bektas was not a theologian but a mystic, being a Muslim who did not give up the 
ancient practices of Central Asia while also interpreting new forms of ritual based on these 
older traditions (Melikoff 1998, 4; Tambar 2012, 660). For example, he did not pray in 
mosques. Instead he climbed mountains with his followers, while the dervishes lit fires 
around which they danced, performing semah (Melikoff 1998, 4). After his death, many 
of the Turkmen tribes continued to follow his religious teachings, organized as ‘Bektashi 
Sufi orders’. To this day the majority of Alevis and early Turkmens still follow the Sufi 
orders of Haci Bektas (Tambar 2012, 653). 
The arrival of the Turkmens to Eastern Anatolia caused a rapid and intense transformation 
that gave birth to the new pastoral nomadism and a new type of tribal structure consisting 
of many diversified groups. Particularly, due to the influence of Kurdish tribes, Islam 
rapidly spread among the other Turkmen tribes. The Islamic transformation among the 
Turkic migrants played out in two different ways (van Bruinessen 2013, 95; Melikoff 
1998, 4-5). One group which maintained their nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle, which 
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was later exposed to some troublesome periods, was the Kizilbas. The other group that 
adopted a sedentary life in urban centers became the Bektashis (Melikoff 1998, 4-5). 
An important point that should be stressed is not only the distinct emergence of these two 
distinct groups, but also how the name given to them, “Alevis”, developed through the 
centuries. For a long time in Ottoman documents, the Kizilbas were called heretics, 
schismatic, Shi’ite and also atheists despite having no definite name. The Kizilbas retained 
their historical name through the centuries, but later they became known as the Alevi. 
Although Kizilbas literally means “red head” and was attributed to them due to their 
headdress that comprised a red bonnet with twelve facets, in Ottoman documents Kizilbas 
was clearly meant to be read as ‘heretic’ and ‘heretic level’ (Melikoff 1998, 5-6). 
Stigmatized as a heterodox group, as well as ascribed all kinds of destructive stereotypes; 
these stigmas persisted for centuries, even after the name Alevi took the place of Kizilbas. 
Any association with the term Alevi/Kizilbas carried negative connotations even well into 
the modern period of Turkey (Sokefeld 2008, 35). Kizilbas was also deemed a swearword 
that implied all the negative stereotypes attributed to Alevis, such as having no morals, no 
honor, and no belief. Such ideas even made their way into official state sponsored 
dictionaries, which the Alevis later fought to have removed (Sokefeld 2008, 43). 
Due to the identicalness in their beliefs, the Alevis became one of the recognized Islamic 
heterodox groups in Turkey, in spite of the fact that the name ‘Alevi’ means ‘to worship 
Ali’; Ali being deemed as sacred by these groups in Turkey (Melikoff 1998, 6). Here it is 
critical to see that the negative attributes attached to the Kizilbas–Alevis and accordingly 
to the Bektashis was the initial sign of their misrecognition by the state, the religious 
institutions and by the majority public, i.e. the Sunni Muslim population (Sokefeld 2008, 
35). This misrecognition brought about persecution and violence that resulted in a strategy 
of further misrecognition (Sokefeld 2008, 35). For example, in order not to be recognized 
by ‘the others’ many Alevis became one of ‘the others’ within the non-Alevi, Sunni 
Muslim-dominated public (Sokefeld 2008, 35). 
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Fuat Köprülü (1890-1965), the pioneer of Alevi folkloric studies as well as the head of 
the Institute of Turkic Studies4, called the Alevis ‘country Bektashis’, as he claimed that 
Alevis were representing themselves as a rough form of Bektashis (Melikoff 1998, 6; 
Massicard 2003, 43). In time, the nuance in the living style between both groups showed 
itself with greater clarity. While Alevis remained as a disclosed society within their 
nomadic lifestyle along with the similar attributes that the Kizilbas had to face, the 
Bektashis were able to penetrate Ottoman society. The likely outcome of this is that one 
cannot become an Alevi unless he/she was born as one, while anyone can become a 
Bektashi. As an organized group, the Bektashis compared to the Kizilbas-Alevis who 
remained relatively disorganized, created two different images particularly in the eyes of 
the late Ottoman period and early Republican Era of Turkey that will be evaluated in the 
third chapter (Melikoff 1998, 6). 
Therefore, even though there is no proof showing the process that institutionally bound 
Alevis to Bektashis as seen from the aforementioned points, there is a certain spiritual 
identicalness between the two that resulted from a paralleled rise for both in-dissociable 
communities in many areas, such as in the political arena – albeit with a certain degree of 
difference (Massicard 2003, 35-36; Melikoff 1998, 7). In the following chapter, I will 
further examine how and to what extent these sects differ in lifestyle, and how this reflects 
on their ultimate position with the Turkish Republic/political sphere. 
2.1.2. Kemalism, Secularism, Laicism 
In this thesis, I will use the term ‘Kemalism’, which refers to the state-led regime of 
modernization introduced at the beginning of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk and his supporters. In addition, the term ‘Kemalists’, stemming from the early 
Republican era of Turkey, refers to Ataturk and his supporters, who later become known 
as the new Republican elites that strongly believed in the Kemalist ideology of progress; 
even if implemented through harsh and repressive measures (Tambar 2012, 670; Göle 
                                                 
4 The Institute of Turkic Studies, founded as a branch of Darulfünun in 1924 (aka. Istanbul University) 
(Massicard 2003, 43). 
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1997, 50). Furthermore I will also use the terms secularism and laicism interchangeably 
in order to understand what Turkish secularism/laicism, or laiklik, is. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the leader of nationalist military forces that established the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923; and the principle term, adopted from his name, that has come 
to describe the essential features of the newfound Republic is Kemalism (Kemalist 
ideology), which was advanced by the nationalist movement particularly during the War 
of Independence of Turkey (1914 – 1918). Kemalist ideology sought to bring about a 
secular nation-state led by educational and scientific progress and centered on the 
principles of rationalism, enlightenment, secularism and positivism (Göle 1997, 48; 
Webster 1973, 245). Despite the latter two being Western concepts, they have attained 
different meanings and roles in Turkey's non-Western, Muslim contexts. As Göle points 
out, “Positivism is a universal model only when it serves to dissociate Western modernity 
from a particularistic culture or religion and is perceived to be a rational mode of thinking 
and acting applicable to all societies” (Göle 1997, 48). In the Turkish context, the 
positivism of Auguste Comte offered the frame of reference for reform which progressive 
Turkish elites, or Kemalists, used to legitimize the Republican elites’ modernization 
attempts (Göle 1997, 48). From the Young Turks onwards, the secular stance of the 
Republic of Turkey, shaped by positivism, was achieved by the Kemalists and was done 
so contrary to the general belief that state secularization could not be achieved in a Muslim 
country because of secularization’s distinct relationship with religion and nationality. The 
Kemalists believed that when their ideology is internalized by the masses by any means, 
there is then no escape from religion (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 65). In addition, in Islam, 
religion and state are seen as fused together; the state is conceived as the embodiment of 
religion, and religion is seen as the essence of the state (Berkes 1964, 7). Even the term 
‘secularization’ stems from the acceptance of religion, and what religion created lately 
was endowed it its own sphere. On the other hand Berkes (1964, 5) states: 
“The use of the term “secularism” in connection with the determination of 
relations between spiritual and temporal authorities gives the impression that 
the condition to which the term refers is found only where such distinctly 
institutionalised authorities coexisted. In this narrow concept, secularism 
 32 
appears to be merely a matter of separating the respective areas of 
jurisdiction of two institutions of authority”. 
In light of the aforementioned points, it is crucial to understand what Turkish secularism 
is and how it was established in Turkey, a Muslim majority country. The answer lies in 
the concept of the French-inspired laicite or laicism, and was due to its highly centralized 
model of change that turned out to be the template of reform for Turkish modernists. 
Therefore, laicism should be seen as the part of the process as opposed to a result of the 
modernization process (Göle 1997, 48).  
Although French laicism requires strong anticlericalism, that is the ultimate separation of 
the church and the state, the Turkish interpretation of laicism is that religious affairs 
should be regulated by the State which incorporates the clerical personnel into the state 
bureaucratic apparatus via the Presidency of Religious Affairs, making them state 
employees with tremendous public and political influence (Parla & Davidson 2008, 69). 
Therefore, it can be interpreted that Kemalist laicism is not ideologically anti-religious, 
thoroughly anti-clerical, or entirely anti-religio-political (Parla & Davidson 2004, 113). 
The main similarity amongst secularism and laicism is that laicism as a modernist 
ideology rejects the existence of religion in the public sphere and supports ‘positive 
sciences’ (Göle 1997, 48; Parla & Davidson 2004, 101). Especially between 1923 and 
1946, state control over religion in relation to the public sphere was rigid in Turkey5. Some 
of the restrictions of the State included: banning religious orders, compulsory Westernized 
dress codes for public servants, and the ‘imposition of certain types of audio-visual 
programming at state radio stations Göle 1997, 49). Later in the 1950s the state’s hold on 
religion softened significantly. 
2.2. Alevi Identity of Turkey 
Even though the Alevis are the biggest sectarian minority in Turkey after the Sunni 
majority, due to the absence of ethnic and madhhab (sectarian-based data), the actual 
population of Alevis in present-day Turkey is not known. Nonetheless various estimates 
                                                 
5 In the Chapter Three rigid control will be detailed. 
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put the number of the Alevi population at a range from 10 to 20 million (15 to 20 per cent 
of the population of Turkey) (Schuler 2002, 171-172; Kehl-Bodrogi 1988, 93; Vorhoff  
1995, 58; Köse 2012, 576-577; Tambar 2012, 653). This situation makes drawing a clear 
Alevi identity and re-categorizing Alevism that already has an inexplicable identification 
even harder.  
As such, attempts of describing Alevis and Alevism bring about a number of definitions 
(Tambar 2012, 653). The ones that define Alevism through religion casts it as essentially 
Islamic, or as an offshoot of Shi’ism, or simply as a Turkish color of Islam or even in 
some cases as a different religion all together. Some others claim that Alevism initially 
emerged as a political situation where its characteristics were politicized whereas others 
emphasize the Shamanist or Zoroastrian sides of Alevism (Vorhoff 1995, 77-181).  
Starting from the early 1960s, the Alevi migration from rural areas to cities brought about 
a drastic change in traditional Alevi identity. Modernized and particularly urbanized 
Alevis gave rise to later identity movements after the 1970s. Despite the introduction of 
movements that helped recognize Alevis, these failed to be enough to describe the Alevi 
identity in one unified definition (Köse 2012, 578; Massicard 2007, 19). The reason for 
this may stem from the focuses of the movements. The identity movements were chiefly 
built around Islamist and Kurdish movements that had religious and ethnic-based 
reference actors. Alevi identity movements in that respect remained weaker due to the 
absence of a clear reference point that it could employ to motivate and unite the whole 
community. The dilemmas in regards to defining Alevism show that Alevism emerged as 
an identity movement without having a clear identity. 
In this respect, in this section and with Alevi historiography in mind, this chapter will 
focus on two notions that are widely believed by scholars to have given birth to a 
traditional Alevi identity for centuries: religion and ethnicity. In relation to the findings of 
this section, the following chapter will evaluate Alevism as an ideology with these two 
concepts in mind. It will also consider how Alevism has situated itself by being exposed 
to external pressures, particularly by the Young Turks and the Kemalists. 
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2.2.1. Alevism as a Religion 
Although usually associated with Shi’ism (Köse 2012), a number of prominent Alevi 
intellectuals have demonstrated a certain distinction between Alevism and Shi’ism 
(Bozkurt 1990; Öz 2001; Şener 1989). According to these scholars, Alevism as a religion 
is a distinct sectarian entity within Islam. The source of distinction of Alevi religiosity is 
origination out of Anatolia itself, which over centuries shaped Alevism’s characteristic 
religious customs. This study will follow the point of views of these thinkers, and though 
it will not view Alevism as an offshoot of Shi’ism, the commonalities shared between the 
two will not be disregarded as well. 
In this regard, it would not be wrong to start evaluating Alevism against its religious 
foundation. However, in order to understand this link, an understanding of the 
anthropological perspective of religion is required. Religions and their rituals are the two 
focal points that anthropological studies of religion primarily focus on. It is necessary to 
view the rituals practiced by believers in order to comprehend a religion, as religion and 
rituals are inseparable for the believer (Radcliffe-Brown 1968, 303).  
Worship then, as a focus of communal ritual, is a significant element for any form of 
religion; because worshiping is seen as the embodiment of the entire religious order, which 
should be fulfilled by the individuals or communities for gods, ancestors and deaths 
(Örnek 1988, 78). Through worship, a believer can communicate with what or whom 
she/he believes in. Worship occupies a big part in any religious society’s social 
interactions and events. For worshiping, individuals or communities need four main 
essentials that are as follows: firstly, a certain place to perform worship such as meeting 
houses, subtle foundations, and sacred places; secondly, specified tools such as masks, 
idols and musical instruments; thirdly, specific dates, for example harvesting times, new 
year's eve, birth and death days of sacred persons, and times for sunsets and sunrises; and 
lastly, a community leader (Örnek 1988, 70). In this regard, the aforementioned four 
elements are also highly critical in order to evaluate and understand Alevism as a religion 
thoroughly.  
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The community leader in Alevism, known as a dede, is of major significance. According 
to Max Weber, charisma, regardless of its source whether it is real, or claim, or ascription, 
is one’s genius. Charismatic authority represents a subject who is obeyed by the majority, 
who is obeyed in turn because of their extraordinary abilities, which are attributed to 
him/her by the very same group (Weber 1993, 252). In a circular and reinforcing way, the 
attributes bestowed upon these charismatic figures also legitimize the leadership status 
given to them. In this respect, dedes should be seen as charismatic religious leaders given 
that their communities view them as those with superior abilities, along with their holistic 
characteristics by being the descendants of Ali and Fatima. The dede then represents a 
distinct posturing of the Alevi as being literally descended from the founders of Islam, 
while also fulfilling a more antiquated Anatolian folk-religious position of community 
spiritual leader, or shaman (Okan 2004, 23; Sokefeld 2008, 265; van Bruinessen 2013, 
118).  
The emergence of the dede is important owing to their position in religion. The shamani 
way of religious leadership of the Alevi society that stemmed from their earlier Turkmen 
nomadic backgrounds changed rapidly under the influence of Safavid Dynasty during the 
sixteenth century. Icazetname introduced by the Safavids for example was dedicated to 
the religious leaders of those Alevi Turkmen communities that laid the foundation of the 
dedelik (Ocak 1996, 253-254). Another possible effect of the Safavids on the Alevis 
relates to Ali, the cousin and the son-in-law of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, who is 
deified by the both communities. The dede within Alevi communities is tied back to Ali 
through familial descent. This characteristic of Alevism is one of the major reasons why 
Alevis appear to many as an offshoot of Shi’ism (van Bruinessen 2013, 118). However, 
this merging of both Islam through descendent leaders and the local tradition of the 
shamanic leader in Anatolian folk-religion, is a way that Alevism distinguishes itself from 
Shi'ism. Alevism is distinguished in that it adheres to a translation of Shi'a Islamic precepts 
into the unique history of Anatolian religious customs, whereas strictly Shi'a religious 
orders do not adopt the Anatolian folk norms into their practice.  
As such, the dede takes on a much wider role as spiritual and community leader within 
Alevism. The duty of the dedes during worship was to regulate intra-society orders, 
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establish ethical rules and punish any offenders by denouncing them within the 
community, instead of simply leading the community members through praying for the 
sake of God (Okan 2004, 25).  
Cem is the most communal Alevi ritual performed by a dede, and also has unique aspects 
that diverge significantly from normal ritual practice in Shi'a Islam. For example, women 
and men participate jointly in the cem, and together worship through the semah, with 
music and dance, which play important roles (Sokefeld 2008, 42, 265). Alevi folk poets 
are also important elements in Alevi folklore. They were indispensable to cems and were 
very well respected by the community. Today, they are perceived as the descendants of 
Shamans and the pioneers of Turkish oral literature (Okan 2004, 67; Massicard 2003, 45).  
Also, unlike in more traditional sects of Islam, there are no designated holy places of 
worship amongst the Alevi. Still, though there is no specified holy place among the 
traditional Alevi, cemevi (Cem-Houses) were erected after the rise of rural-urban 
migration in order to accommodate the needs of community ritual in the new urban 
settings. Cemevi is a modern Turkish invention that represents a building that is used by 
urban Alevi followers where cem is celebrated and performed by the masses. The 
emergence of the cemevi comes with the need for the community to congregate and 
perform their rituals; as a result cemevis have also become significant community centers 
for Alevis (Sokefeld 2008, 265; van Bruinessen 2013, 118). 
The Alevi also have distinct religious holidays that belong specifically to their religious 
communities and are not shared by other Islamic sects. For example, Muharram is the first 
month of the Islamic lunar calendar. For Alevis, it is believed that the martyrdom of Imam 
Hussein, the son of Caliph Ali and one of the Twelve Holy Imams, at the battle of Karbala, 
corresponds to the tenth day of Muharram (Netton 1997, 177). This is why the month of 
Muharram is accepted as a holy month amongst the Alevi; the ‘Month of Mourning’. 
During this month, followers of the Alevi creed break their fasts with simple dinners that 
preclude dairy products or water (Göner 2005, 130). 
Consequently, Alevism, like any other religion, consists then of four essentials; a 
community leader i.e. a dede, certain rituals, places of worship and its own holy days in 
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order to regulate the behavior of its society; all of which has been shaped over hundreds 
of years. Moreover these essentials have also become the main part of the Alevi cultural 
identity. In this regard, within Alevism, as worship became a societal practice, it also 
became a societal phenomenon among other communities that the Alevi have had to share 
social space with (Okan 2004, 22). 
2.2.2. Alevism as an Ethnicity 
Apart from the descriptions that attempt to identify Alevism through religious means, 
irrespective of its correlation with Shi’ism, some scholars have also emphasized the ethnic 
identity of the Alevi phenomena (Andrews & Beninghaus 1989; Okan 2004). Due to the 
strong communal group identity, the significance of the continuity of the community in 
Alevism, and also owing to the unsurprising result of a closed society, endogamy was one 
of the expected outcomes brought about by the traditional Alevi identity. In addition to 
this endogamous social order, Alevism could only be passed on patrilineally (Kehl-
Bodrogi 1996, 64-67). With these two cases in mind, it is not hard to see the clear 
connection between the notion of ethnicity and the self-enclosedness of Alevi 
communities (Okan 2004, 25). On the other hand, according to Andrews, to be able to 
identify an ethnic group, we should look at how this group identifies itself and perceives 
the others at present around it (Andrews 1992, 17). Despite there being other explicit 
criteria in relation to their ethnic roots, a more valid identification is these roots’ reflection 
to today’s definitions (Andrews 1992, 57). In this respect, the distinction between 
ethnicity and race is important to mention. Ethnicity, unlike race, does not consist of 
people who have the same biological formation; it is rather related to culture and identity 
(Kupper & Kupper 1985, 268). Considering Alevis in this context, from the sixteenth 
century onwards they have increasingly been shown to have the features of an ethnic 
community.  
During the sixteenth century, by being under the political as well as the religious influence 
of the Safavid Dynasty, and as a result being persecuted by the Ottoman government, they 
became marginalized within Ottoman society (Okan 2004, 28-29). The geographical areas 
they began to settle in after being marginalized, in addition to the aforementioned 
endogamous life style of Alevis, drew a certain line between the Alevi communities and 
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its others (Okan 2004, 29; Kehl-Bodrogi 1996, 52-52). This was also the period when 
Ottoman historiographers began to view the Kizilbas/Alevi groups as heretics. Still, this 
exclusion also strengthened a sense of Alevi unity (Okan 2004, 29). In addition to this, 
the fact that today in their daily relations and speech, Alevis frequently mention non-
Alevis as yabancı, or stranger, this also leads us to think of the Alevis as a community 
with an awareness of ethnic differences between themselves and non-Alevis. Thus, in light 
of these mentioned points it is not possible to comprehend Alevism only within its 
religious affiliations. 
These distinct cultural, religious and ethnic characteristics which Alevism have existed in, 
points to an important role, both in the formation of their identity and perception of the 
Alevis by the Sunni majority. While Alevism became predominantly understood as a 
heterodox branch of Islam, both Alevis’ and non-Alevis’ perception of this group became 
even more discriminating and intolerant. This then shaped a political and social tension 
under rules that were mostly in favor of Sunni Islam, and prepared the grounds for them 
to embrace a more secular political ideology; one that is in relatively less support of 
politically strengthening Sunni Islam. In other words, Alevis as a historically, socially, 
and culturally unified group had been long conditioned to reposition their identities under 
the Kemalist ideology when it emerged, because it offered a political stance that aligned 
with the Alevi community's dual needs for both their religious and social identity 
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Chapter III. Alevi Politicization and Socialization Processes 
3.1. Alevis in the Ottoman Era 
Religious pluralism is rooted in the Qur’an; “For each of you, religious communities: 
Jews, Christians, Muslims we have appointed a law and ritual”, thus showing the explicit 
acceptance of religious diversity (amongst the Abrahamic based faiths) that was also 
adopted by the Muslim majority in the Ottoman Empire (Sonn 2005, 74). However, 
Ottoman rule over minorities was not the necessarily neutral and became the main and 
most significant dynamic that determined various minority groups’ socialization and 
politicization under throughout centuries of Ottoman rule. In this respect, the Alevis’ 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire is important to highlight here, not only because they 
were the biggest sectarian Muslim group, but also because the sixteenth-century Ottoman 
era was a distinctive period, determining the emergence of the Alevi formation of identity; 
which continues to carry major characteristics within the Alevi community even to this 
day (Okan 2004, 81). 
In this section, an examination of the Alevis during Ottoman rule after the sixteenth 
century until the formation of the new Republic of Turkey will occur. Therefore, an 
intended emphasis will be placed on the influence of the Safavid Dynasty carried by the 
Alevis under the Ottoman Empire, before and after the Battle of Chaldiran (1514). In this 
regard, special attention will be given to the transformation in the attitude of Ottoman 
governance over minorities, again with relation to the Battle of Chaldiran. This section 
will also highlight the change in perception of the Alevis by the Ottoman government 
under the Young Turk era, and the further definition that Alevi communities underwent, 
especially in relation to the influence of the Bektashi community at that time. 
Even though the Ottoman Empire was tolerant towards ethnic and religious minorities 
from its early days, it began to lose its tolerance for heterodox groups particularly after it 
declared itself the defender of Sunnism against the Shi’ite Safavid Dynasty. The reason 
behind this declaration was not only to unify all Sunnis against the Safavid Dynasty, but 
also to identify other potential political threats that appeared supportive of the aims of 
Shah Ismail (Sokefeld 2008, 42; Ocak 1998, 94-95). The tariqats and the sects attached 
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to Safavids that were living in Ottoman territory, also came under the threat of the 
Ottoman Empire during this time. Alevi communities were also one of the heterodox 
groups that appeared attached to the Safavids (Ocak 1998, 94-95). Therefore, the Safavid 
Dynasty had both a direct and indirect effect over the Alevi communities. In this respect, 
the influence of the Safavids on the Alevis can be examined in three ways. 
The first effect is the political influence of the Safavid Dynasty. Whether it was an 
intentional effort on the part of Alevis or not, it is not easy to predict the extent of the 
political effect of the Safavids on the Alevis, yet the Safavid Dynasty legitimized the 
political aspect of its supporters by creating a stance against the Ottomans. In this regard, 
this situation can be seen as their first politicization for the Alevi communities, 
highlighting a theme ever present in Alevi political action; that of being in a position of 
‘taking sides’. 
Secondly, the religious impact of the Safavid Dynasty was more effective and critical for 
the future of the cultural, political and religious formation of the Alevi communities. The 
shamanist and tribal way of religious leadership in Alevi society had changed with the 
impact of the Safavids through seyyidlik. In addition to this, the religious leaders of the 
Alevi communities were distributed icazetname, a diploma that gave birth to the 
aforementioned dedelik institution in the previous chapter, and has become one of the 
essentials of the structure of Alevism (Ocak 1996, 253-254). 
The third and most significant effect of the Safavid Dynasty over Alevis was the 
ostracizing of the Safavid Dynasty and any affiliated groups within the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottoman's accused the founder of the Safavid Dynasty, Shah Ismail, and his followers 
of being atheists. By viewing them as atheists, Ottoman rule legitimized the pressure they 
imposed upon them. The oppression that Ottoman rule put into action from the beginning 
of the sixteenth century came in the shape of mass arrests, deportation and massacres, 
which were not only limited to Shah Ismail’s supporters (Sokefeld 2008, 42). All other 
heterodox groups within the Ottoman Empire, including the Shi’ites who were also seen 
as heterodox, were also heavily affected by Ottoman oppression. As a result, Alevis, 
simply by being the biggest Anatolian community related to the Safavids, experienced 
oppression to a greater extent than the other groups (Refik 1932; Ocak 1998, 94-95).  
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The repression of non-Sunni groups at the beginning of the Battle of Chaldiran originated 
from a functional security purpose that tried to suppress the strengthening Safavid 
Dynasty. However, in time, the policies against non-Sunni groups turned into an essential 
part of an Ottoman ideology towards non-Sunnis from that time onwards, even until the 
end of the Ottoman Empire (Refik 1932; Ocak 1998, 94-95). To a great extent, the 
suppression of Ottoman rule lost its brutality after the big defeat of the Safavids in the 
Battle of Chaldiran on 23 August 1514, which was fought by the Ottoman Empire under 
the rule of Yavuz Sultan Selim (1512 –h1520). Sunni ideology during the Ottoman Empire 
became the inexpugnable power that the Sultanate grasped, excluding any other alien 
identities including the Alevis. Along with the Caliphate title that Yavuz Sultan Selim 
gained from the Mamluk Sultanate, the Sunni base of the Ottoman Empire strengthened 
over other religious groups (Gölpınarlı 1969, 87; Massicard 2003, 33). 
On the other hand, the damage that the Kizilbas/Alevis suffered after the Battle of 
Chaldiran prevented them to a great extent from rebelling against the Ottoman Empire 
(Massicard 2003, 33). The Alevis followed certain strategies in order to protect themselves 
from further persecutions and deportations. They located themselves mostly in the 
mountainous areas in Anatolia so as not to be accessed easily by others (Sokefeld 2008, 
42). However, the neglect of the Ottoman Empire as well as the exclusion from Sunni 
societies was the biggest challenge to the Alevi communities. Even after the establishment 
of the Republic, the Alevis still continued to live under strict isolation. Cases of the violent 
persecution of Alevis, especially under the Ottoman rule, can be seen as the primary 
reasons behind this; because these experiences were deeply rooted in the collective 
memory of the Alevis (Sokefeld 2008, 42). Therefore, for the Alevi communities it was 
significant to “not be recognized as Alevi in a non-Alevi environment” (Sokefeld 2008, 
42).  
This situation certainly brought about some permanent features for the community. In 
order to maintain their societal-religious order and integrity, the Alevi dedelik institution 
necessitated isolation from outsider societies. Keeping rituals exclusively in the 
community and also marriage solely within the community, and having neither societal 
nor economical contact with non-Alevis, were some of the major strategies that the rules 
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stipulated as an outcome of the misrecognition of the Alevis (Kehl-Bodrogi 1988, 6, 69; 
Sokefeld 2008, 42). By having members who were controlled by a strong, isolated 
community, and by having members who obeyed the religious authority to which they 
were subjected, the Alevis were characterized as a secret community and Alevism was 
widely seen as a secret religion (Kehl-Bodrogi 1988, 6, 69). Thus, this subtle life of Alevis 
within their isolated village-based establishments from the sixteenth century to the multi-
party era became the main ground of their various iteration of identities, both within the 
community and outside of the community. 
Expected and unexpected results of having the subtle lifestyle of the Alevis from the 
sixteenth century onwards can be examined from two different angles that have remained 
valid until today. Firstly, the perception of Alevis by the Ottoman government and the 
Sunni population under Ottoman rule was transformed into a negative misrecognition 
based on stereotypes. Moreover, the relation between both parties, despite the fact that it 
was not elusive in practice, had changed acutely. Secondly, the formation of the Alevis 
was undergoing a number of alterations. 
Initially, during the Ottoman Empire, the idle rumors about the amoral lives of Alevi 
families were one of the most adverse effects upon the isolated lifestyle of the community 
(Massicard 2003, 38). Another group who faced similar rumors and had adopted a similar 
attitude to protect themselves from other mainstream groups was the Sabbateans (Okan 
2004, 32). Apart from the isolated lifestyle, cem also constituted the antithesis of Sunni 
prayer, and invoked many kinds of imaginations by non-Alevis about what men and 
women actually do during Alevi rituals. For example, one such rumor stated that ‘candles 
are extinguished’ and in that darkness men and women indulge in sexual, even incestuous, 
orgies (Sokefeld 2008, 42). As a result, through the centuries, before replaced by ‘Alevi’ 
in the nineteenth century, the term ‘Kizilbas’ remained in common use by non-Alevis to 
refer to heretics because of the predominance of prejudices based on unfounded 
accusations. However, despite the maligned “official” perception of Alevis sponsored by 
the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman government also saw the Alevi communities as tribes 
that were in need of paying their taxes to the State (Gökalp 1980, 27-29). So, the 
 43 
relationship between the Alevi communities and the Ottoman governance remained at the 
State level for the subsequent centuries. 
While Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876 - 1909) placed great emphasis on the unification of 
Muslim societies, he took the Sunni interpretation of Islam as the major path to follow for 
this purpose, as his ancestors had also done (Kieser 2000). Due to the fact that there were 
a significant number of non-Muslims residing within the empire, during the nineteenth 
century, the Ottoman Empire, in order to control non-Muslim communities, 
institutionalized the millets. These institutions consisted of the monotheistic religions of 
Christianity and Judaism. Millets were given certain autonomy in their religious activities 
but were kept distant from the ruler-ship. Nonetheless, groups that did not belong to Sunni 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism were seen as heretics and excluded from the legal 
framework. In this context, their religious differences were neither accepted nor tolerated 
in an institutionalized context. Despite being the largest minority amongst Muslims within 
the Ottoman Empire, the Alevis were obliged to be ignored as a heretical group and were 
not represented by any religious institution within the Empire (Okan 2004, 159; Massicard 
2003, 39).  
On the other hand the State, in order to integrate the ‘heretics’, or in other words the 
heterodox religions that were neglected by the official religion of the State, followed 
different methods. Firstly, even though it was neither a big, nor a successful effort on the 
part of the State, particularly after the zeal and activity of Protestant missionaries within 
Alevi communities, the Ottoman government attempted to Sunnify the Alevi groups by 
building mosques in Alevi villages (Kieser 2000). 
Secondly, the isolation that Alevis underwent made the dedes more powerful. They 
became the key actors who guided the relations between and within Alevi village 
communities. Therefore, the Alevi communities became more attached to each other. The 
unexpected result was an autonomous position of Alevi communities in their own villages; 
this gave birth to a suitable environment for them to develop their own rituals and practices 
that were uninfluenced by external societies, where their identity and culture reproduced 
itself over hundreds of years by being genuinely distinct from the rest of Ottoman society 
(Kehl-Bodrogi 1993, 42-43).  
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Institutionalizing non-Muslim communities under millets also had an important impact in 
that outcome. This situation not only created an environment for the Alevis to attach to 
each other more in their communities (Okan 2004, 68), but it also made them rely on the 
stronger attachment to other community members. This was necessary as they believed in 
destiny, which resulted in their acceptance of the isolated and unwanted existence as a 
community. 
The Young Turk era6 during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire was powerful enough 
to change the centuries’ long pressure on minority groups to a certain degree. Even though 
the Young Turks were still under the influence of Sunni Muslim domination in the Empire, 
religious minority groups were tolerated to a greater extent than they were before under 
absolute monarchic Ottoman rule.  
Under these circumstances, the Alevis saw the chance to showcase themselves in the 
public arena by drawing greater attention than the other suppressed minority groups. In 
this regard, particularly in this period, the role that the Bektashis played for the benefit of 
the Alevis was remarkable. But because there was a significant difference of perception 
between these two highly similar communities, which stemmed from their lifestyles, the 
Bektashis gained a greater and unprecedented political influence than the Alevis, 
especially during Tanzimat Period (Melikoff 1998, 6-7). This could be attributed to the 
fact that the Bektashis were seen as the most appropriate tariqat living in the Ottoman 
territory that would fit in with the progressive Tanzimat. Not only did their liberal and 
progressive thoughts attract a number of significant Tanzimat figures that were attached 
to the Sufis, but many of them also became part of the Young Turks (Melikoff 1998, 7). 
Due to the similarities in spirituality and freethinking nature of the Alevis with that of the 
Bektashis, the Alevis also gained recognition by the State. Nonetheless, this recognition 
was limited compared to that of the Bektashis, as the Alevis preserved a sense of secrecy 
within their communities (Melikoff 1998, 7).  
                                                 
6 Young Turks revealed themselves with the revolution that was started with CUP rebellion in the army 
during June – July 1908 and Abdülhamid was forced to restore the constitution. Young Turk revolution 
continued ten more years until the defeat of Ottoman Empire in the First World War in 1918 (Ahmad 
2002, 2). 
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Thanks to influential leaders, the Bektashis accomplished their mission by creating and 
fostering support for the Young Turk revolution, along with the Alevis in Anatolia. It was 
known in the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century onwards that there was a strong 
connection between community members and the tribes amongst the Alevis. Thus, unity 
among the community members was significant. In this regard, the unconditional support 
of the followers for their leader was taken advantage of by the Young Turks. Nevertheless, 
immediately after the successful outcome of the Young Turks’ revolution, the Alevis were 
not needed anymore for the Young Turk cause. Powerful Alevi leaders were made use of 
as political tools in order to build a solid foundation for Tanzimat reforms (Massicard 
2003, 39-41), not because of the big religious population they represented in the Ottoman 
Empire, but because of their power over their followers. Therefore, the Alevis were again 
marginalized and eliminated from the political scene. Their appearance in the public arena, 
created by the Young Turks, was an insignificant one, and diminished quickly. The 
Ottoman perspective on the Alevi thus continued with not much change; the Alevis were 
still simply tribal communities that paid tax to the State (Gökalp 1980, 27-29). 
The Ottoman era for the Alevis, starting from the sixteenth century onward, played a 
critical role in Alevi identity building. Along with the results of the Battle of Chaldiran, 
the Safavid Dynasty-effect on Alevis can be taken as the first indicator of a real historical 
difference between the Alevis’ political and religious standpoint from that of the Ottoman 
Sunni communities. Even though politicization of the Alevis under Ottoman rule was 
weak, the progressive stance of the Alevis helped them to re-emerge from the ashes of the 
Ottoman Empire, also with the attention that the Young Turks paid them, and they would 
become important nation-building actors for the modernity7 project of the new Republic 
of Turkey (Massicard 2003, 41-42). 
In the following section, the resurrection of the Alevi community under the Republican 
People’s Party will be examined. 
                                                 
7 The ‘modernization project’ of the Kemalists for the new Republic, means here the parallel changes that 
took place between the free market economy, nation-state development, and more open and tolerant 
inclusion of previously marginalized communal living formations (Kasaba 1998, 15). 
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3.2. Alevis during the Early Republican Era 
The Turkish nation-state was forged from the multinational, multilingual and multi-
religious Ottoman Empire. With the deportation of Armenians in 1915 8 , and the 
population exchange in 1923 between the Republic of Turkey and Greece9 stipulated by 
the 1923 –s1925 Treaty of Lausanne, the new Republic became more homogenous to a 
certain extent in terms of hosting proportionately more Muslims than non-Muslims, 
compared to the country’s previous demographics (Zürcher 2004, 175; Treaty of Lausanne 
1923, Sect.I - Art.2). However, after the Armenian deportation and population exchange 
between Turkey and Greece, the denominational and ethnic diversity among Muslims in 
Turkey had still remained significant. This situation coincided with the aims of Mustafa 
Kemal and his followers, which was aimed at purifying real “Turkishness”; particularly 
from the influence of the Islamic cultures that pervaded during the Ottoman Era. This was 
to be done using an autocratic Kemalist ideology (Georgean 1986, 137; Okan 2004, 86-
87). In 1925, Mustafa Kemal drew attention to the “establishment of a nationalist 
republic” in place of the Ottoman Empire (Parla & Davidson 2004, 98). 
In this regard, the Young Turks’ era which was followed by the Republicans, or at the 
time the Kemalists, particularly after 1908, should be seen as critical not only because of 
the formation and birth of a Turkish national consciousness during this period, but also 
because it was the period in which the Young Turk revolution became the major initiator 
of this newfound Turkish identity formation (Ahmad 2002, 78).  
Some decades after the foundation of the Republic, it has been observed that the one-party 
period of Republican People’s Party (1923 – 1950) drew the required citizenship image 
for a homogenous nation, by successfully undertaking a number of different strategies: 
creating the new Turkish identity that was reinvented from Anatolian traditions, while 
limiting the power of religion by abolishing the Caliphate office and controlling religion 
                                                 
8 Armenian deportation lasted until the late 1916 that had also included western Anatolia (Zürcher 2004, 
175). 
9 Like all other non-Muslim minorities –Armenians, Jewish and the remaining Greek Orthodox communities 
after the population exchange- Sabbatean people preferred to live in the big cities of Turkey. Later, even in 
the first years of the Republic of Turkey religious minorities were established as communities outside of 
Istanbul, as with the Sabbateans. They tended to settle into the cosmopolitan and wealthy districts of Istanbul 
(Neyzi 2002, 145). 
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through the Diyanet, the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The new identity attributed to 
Turkish citizenship was modern, laic and nationalist, as well as Sunni-Turkified Muslim 
(İcduygu & Keyman 1998-9, 150-151). Kemalist elites intentionally gave a role to religion 
in the form of a ‘Turkified Islam’. This was conceptualized according to laicist principles, 
which would facilitate and make national harmony in ‘modern Turkey’ stronger instead 
of putting religion at the centre of the state (Karasipahi 2009, 17). As such, Alevism 
figured prominently as cultural heritage which embodied many of the characteristics that 
the new regime wished to model their vision of a national identity upon. 
Although the extent of the connection between the State and Islam was less than it that 
had been under Ottoman rule, the relationship was not cut completely off (Parla & 
Davidson 2004, 113). Kemalist laicism while expelling Islam from certain areas of 
‘governance and social life’, religious life was still maintained but with a reformed 
character as a regulated state institution which was progressively modeled to be beneficial 
for the larger Kemalist social reforms (Parla & Davidson 2004, 91). In other words, within 
the boundaries of ‘the ideological transformationist and nationalist’ goals of the Kemalist 
modernization project, Turkified Islam was also modified (Parla & Davidson 2004, 113; 
Göle 1997, 48).  
Nonetheless it would not be right to give all the credit of the re-emergence of religion 
within the new State to the modernization project. Kemalist laicism was still required to 
meet the religious needs of the new nation inherited from its Islamic Ottoman predecessor, 
which was the main feature that differentiated Turkish anticlericalism from the French 
version of laicite (Parla & Davidson 2004, 113; Parla & Davidson 2008, 69). Thus, this 
situation underlined the clericalist nature of the Kemalist laicism. State regulated religious 
theory, in accordance especially with governance practices aimed at the new national 
character, resulted in the closure of the active institutions of folk Islam and put a limit to 
the activities of the believers in such institutions.  
“To understand the traditionalist, antilaicist view of Kemalism as an attack 
on Islam, one needs to see Islam not only as a “religion” (to be separated 
from and superseded in affairs of politics and education), but, according to 
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Serif Mardin, as a “rich store of symbols and ways of thinking about society”. 
(Mardin 1989, 156) 
“Kemalism clearly rejects this holistic outlook. Its discourse is permeated 
with the idea that those who opposed laicist changes were “backward”, 
“reactionary” and “obscurantist””. (Parla & Davidson 2004, 114) 
For being conveniently compatible and related to the requisite identity model of the 
Republicans, the Alevis in that era again became an appealing community to the ruling 
body –much like they were for the Young Turks under the Ottoman rule. This time, their 
allure came as a result not only because of the strong support they lent to the reformist 
Young Turks, due to their openness to liberal and progressive views, but also because they 
were seen as a substantial contributor to the pure form of Turkishness that was needed to 
build the new nation-sense by the Republicans. For this purpose, Turkishness leaned on 
“the history and traditions of Anatolia” which like Alevi traditions “had to be rediscovered 
or even manufactured”, according to the necessities of the new Turkish identity (Ahmad 
2002, 78). Though, because of the desire to still regulate religious life in the new republic 
through the Diyanet, the Alevi were only regarded as an exemplary ground for Turkish 
identity construction. The government maintaining its authority over what would 
constitute religious orthodoxy in the new state.  
In the following section, how and to what extent the new Republic had paid attention to 
the Alevi communities in the period of creating a new Turkish identity will be evaluated 
and in this respect, special attention will also be paid to the Kurdish Alevis along with the 
Turkish Alevis respectively. 
3.2.1. Role of Alevis in Nation building 
Folklore played an important role in nation-building process of the Republic of Turkey. 
Turkmen culture, and Alevi folklore in particular, was seen as the purest form of what 
contained the targeted folkloric essentials, and could be used as the initiator for re-building 
a new country according to ‘the state-sanctioned nationalist ideologies’ of the Kemalists 
(Tambar 2012, 653). Therefore both, Turkish and Kurdish Alevis were of great 
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importance for Atatürk’s modernization project (Melikoff 1998, 7; van Bruinessen 2013, 
120). It should be noted however, that Alevism was figured as a tool for use towards a 
new national religious identity, not the goal in itself of the religious model that the 
Kemalist regime wished to institute. 
Because of the Ottoman Empire’s long history of rule, the major groups of the society – 
except some heterodox and nomadic groups –identified themselves with Islam (Georgean 
1995, 4). In his famous speech, that was later published as a book entitled: Nutuk, Mustafa 
Kemal also stressed the necessity of the purification of Islam and stated that “It should be 
purified and raised from the political situation in which it has been put for centuries” (Parla 
& Davidson 2004, 108). To be able to break the ties between the Sunni Muslims and Islam, 
the Alevis were seen as complementary essentials to Turkmen folklore because of the 
Turkmen background of the Alevis (Melikoff 1998, 1, 2). Thus, with its traditions the 
Alevi creed was institutionalized to be the best available alternative for the refinement of 
Turkishness from strictly foreign Islamic attributes, and accordingly Alevism was seen to 
provide a convenient alternative to Sunni Islam; which was perceived as a ‘primitive’ 
Arab religion at the time (Salcır1940, 150; Tambar 2012, 658). For the new republic, 
which was established with the aim of becoming a developed country, being categorized 
with the underdeveloped Arab nations of the time was unacceptable for the new Turkish 
government. Therefore, studies focusing on the Alevis, in order to evaluate the ‘Turkish 
nation’s authentic past’, identified Alevi rituals and reinvented them according to the 
ideological interest of Kemalist nationalists (Tambar 2012, 658).  
In addition to the Alevi communities’ stand-points, from which reformist Kemalists were 
appropriating for their modernization goals, Alevi folk poets who were active in cems 
were also encouraged to spread the official Kemalist ideology of the Turkish Republic all 
over Anatolia (Massicard 2003, 45). This example is another important indicator that 
Alevi culture, with its rituals, was utilized by Kemalists in numerous ways to establish a 
strong Turkish nation-state. 
The distinction between the Turkish and Kurdish Alevi groups and their relation to the 
new nation-building process of the Republic of Turkey has not been drawn in this study 
until now; as such differentiation was not taken into careful consideration by the 
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Kemalists. The reason for missing this differentiation was due to the fact that regardless 
of their ethnic background, Alevi communities under the rule of the Ottoman Empire acted 
and behaved similarly and were thus treated as similar by the Ottoman governance. 
Furthermore, it was not the goal of the Kemalist to reinforce the ethnic diversities that 
constitute Alevism, but rather to model a homogenous “Turkish” ethnicity that 
symbolically utilized Anatolian folk origins as part of its state-sponsored mythical 
heritage. Nonetheless, Kurdish Alevis became a distinct entity after the rise in power of 
the new State. The following section deals with the reason as to why and to what extent 
Kurdish Alevis acted similarly and where and how they differed vis-a-vis Turkish Alevis. 
3.2.1.1. Kurdish Alevis and Kurdish Sunnis 
The deportation of Armenians in 1915 and the population exchange in 1923 between the 
Republic of Turkey and Greece led to an unexpected result, aside from simply creating an 
ethnically and religiously more homogenous environment in Turkey. Essentially after 
Armenians were deported, the Eastern Anatolian cities were left to populations dominated 
by Kurdish people during the War of Independence (1914 – 1918). With the collapse of a 
common enemy shared between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples, the Russian Front left 
those two communities alone in the region. In a short time, these ethnically different 
communities became arch-rivals in the region. Due to this situation, tension began to brew 
between both parties, and led to the formation of the first Kurdish cultural and political 
organizations; such as Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, founded in Istanbul in 1918 (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 31-32; Zürcher 2004, 253). Soon after the creation of the first branch, 
this organization extended its influence through other branches mostly in Kurdistan, for 
Kirmanci and Zaza speaking Kurdish peoples, Sunni Kurdish and Alevi Kurdish peoples, 
even though the members of these organizations predominantly consisted of Sunnis (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 72; Zürcher 2004, 253). 
Even though the friction amongst the Turkish and Kurdish communities in the Eastern 
Anatolia region was palpable, the Kurdish communities did not take advantage of 
positions given to them by external separatist powers (Romano 2006, 28; Zürcher 2004, 
253). In other words, contrary to general belief, there was no solid distinction between 
Turkish and Kurdish Muslims from the late Ottoman to early Republican era (van 
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Bruinessen 2013, 72). Firstly, the efforts of British spies’ during the War of Independence 
and secondly, the autonomy given to the Kurdish communities through the Serves Treaty 
did not change the side that Kurdish communities had hitherto taken (Romano 2006, 28; 
Zürcher 2004, 253).  
After winning the war of Independence and with the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, the new borders separated Kurdish tribal communities mainly into two countries: 
Turkey and Iraq. However during the independence struggle, the Kurdish population was 
promised autonomy by the Kemalists. Moreover, Kurdish people believed that it was 
better to be under a new Ottoman Empire, Turkey, than to be under a British-ruled Iraq 
(van Bruinessen, 2013, 73). Nonetheless, not only were such promises forgotten –the new 
border regulations being a crucial example– but were also not mentioned in the Treaty of 
Lausanne10, unlike other minorities whose rights were guaranteed by Article 41 (Ahmad 
2002, 80; Zürcher 2004, 253). These outcomes created a deep sense of frustration among 
Kurdish nationalists, some of whom were members of the Young Turks movement which 
founded the Union and Progress Party (van Bruinessen, 2013, 73). As a result, some 
Kurdish individuals founded an organization for Azadi (liberty) that is significant even 
today for the Kurdish nationalist movement. The major importance of this organization 
comes from Seyh Said, who was a part of this organization and enjoyed great power 
amongst the Kurdish by virtue his Naksibendi background. 
Under these circumstances it is important to underline that Kurdish ethnicity is older than 
Kurdish nationalism, in order to understand why separatist nationalist movements 
emerged. Serefname is a document in which the emeer of Bitlis, Seref Han, wrote about 
the Kurdish dynasties’ history in 1597 (van Bruinessen 2013, 28, 59). In his book, Seref 
Han differentiates Kurdish people from Ottomans, Persians, Arabs and Armenians. His 
‘Kurdish’ description includes not only ‘real’ Kurdish speakers but also Zazas; not only 
Sunnis but also Alevis and Yezidis (van Bruinessen 2013, 28).  
                                                 
10 Treaty of Lausanne (June 1923). is a crucial treaty apart from protecting minority rights of Turkey 
defined its borders and set the rules of the population exchange in between Turkey and Greece  (Ahmad 
2002, 3; Zürcher 2004, 243,253). 
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On the other hand, Mem u Zin, written in Kurdish by the poet and scholar Ahmed Hani 
(1650 -1706), can be seen as an extension of Kurdish literature, as it comprises modern 
nationalist ideas. This book was put forward as the Kurdish-written-book to show that the 
Kurdish people have their own culture and to counter the general opinion that the Kurdish 
people do not possess one example of their own literature (van Bruinessen 2013, 28-29).  
Later in the twentieth century, Hani’s work became a Kurdish cultural source of honour.  
One of the leading Kurdish families, the Bedirhan family, accepted Mem u Zin as the 
Kurdish national epic (van Bruinessen 2013, 29). Thus, it can be said that from the 
sixteenth century, Kurdish ethnicity consciously existed among the Kurdish emeers and 
elites. Even though Sunnis were the core of this consciousness, at that stage, language and 
religion were not the key determinants of the ethnic stance. Denominational differences 
were not particularly important either. Depending on the alliances that were established 
amongst the Kurdish people, either with the Ottomans or with the Safavids, they often 
converted from Sunnism to Shi’ism11 or vice versa (van Bruinessen 1981 cited in van 
Bruinessen 2013, 30). This awareness of unity was derived from locality, tribal culture 
and ethos, historical commonality, similar emeers’ role on integration and the language, 
as well as other cultural differences between the neighboring Arab and Turkish tribes (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 30).  
Despite there being strong awareness of their unity amongst Kurdish people, that was 
never enough to establish political integration among the Kurdish groups. Aside from the 
point made on the unparalleled growth of ethnic and nationalist awareness, the conflicts 
among the tribes that continued is another significant reason for their failure to integrate 
politically. From the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, along with the elimination of 
the emeers and other community leaders, Kurdish ethnicity was further ruptured (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 30; Ahmad 2002, 58; Zürcher 2004, 253-254). 
This situation should be seen as the foundation of the different stances that Turkish and 
Kurdish Alevis took particularly for the Seyh Said Rebellion. Because of the abolishment 
                                                 
11 Shi’ism and Alevism should not be seen as overlapping in this case. Alevism is as distant to Shi’ism as 
it is to Sunnism. Alevis have their own religious rituals which distinguish them from these two dominate 
sects of Islam (van Bruinessen 2013, 63).  
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of the Caliphate in 1924, religion, the strongest link between the new Turkey and the 
Kurdish population, gradually evaporated. On the other hand, the Turkish government 
built a strong nation-state with a pure ‘Turkish identity’, which consequently led to the 
oppression of other minority identities. The Alevis were elevated, while the Kurdish 
people became one of the oppressed minorities. Speaking and teaching or generally 
utilizing Kurdish language and culture of any kind was prohibited, and thousands of 
influential Kurdish families were deported from their homelands in order to settle in the 
Western parts of Turkey (van Bruinessen 2013, 44; Ahmad 2002, 79; Zürcher 2004, 254; 
Olson 1989, 125). 
These circumstances gave rise to the Kurdish Seyh Said Rebellion in February 1925, 
which aimed to found an independent Kurdistan. That rebellion mainly consisted of Zaza 
tribes. However, as a result of the rise of one major tribe among the Kurdish communities, 
big conflicts among the Kurdish communities arose inevitably after the Kurdish Alevi 
groups stood against the Sunni rebels. In order to understand the strength of the ethnicity’s 
significance regarding the political stance of Alevis, it is important to point out why Alevis 
disproved of the Seyh Said Rebellion. In this respect, two possibilities can be put forward. 
Firstly, Kurdish leaders had demanded their own autonomous Shariah-ruled country with 
the Caliphate office. Yet heterodox communities, mainly Turkish Alevis, opposed to the 
Sunni-traditionalist Ottoman approach, supported Kemalist Laicism since this offered a 
more neutral environment for Alevis; therefore, this conservative approach either 
belonged to Turkish Sunnis or Kurdish Sunnis (Ahmad 2002, 58; Zürcher 2004, 253-254; 
van Bruinessen 2013, 119). Secondly, the Kurdish Alevi people were only a minority 
amongst the greater Kurdish population and saw themselves as closer to their Turkish 
speaking coreligionists than to Sunni Kurdish groups, even to this very day (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 63, 103, 119). This situation also stems from the unique ethnic 
characteristics of the Alevis regardless of the language they speak (van Bruinessen 2013, 
70).  
With the aforementioned points in mind, it is now known that Kurdish Alevis supported 
Kemalist Laicism instead of Shariah rule (van Bruinessen 2013, 119). On the other hand, 
the Dersim riot, a Turkish-Alevi revolt inspired by the Kurdish riots, was not supported 
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by any Kurdish Alevis. This is another important indicator that language was not much of 
a determinant as religion or ethnicity was in defining borders in the Alevis’ case (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 33, 70, 103). 
Since the sixteenth century, it was known that Turkish and Kurdish Sunnis felt prejudices 
towards the Alevis (Ahmad 2002, 58; Zürcher 2004, 253-254). Some fanatic Sunnis went 
as far as to reject the Alevis as being legitimate members of the Islamic world (Okan 2004, 
159). Therefore, it was natural for the Alevis to support laicism. This was not only because 
of the role that Kemalist initial attempts at laicism attributed to them during the nation-
building process, but also because the Alevis gained their recognition over the suppression 
of the Sunni population mainly due to the damage that the Kemalist project of the 
“purification of Turkishness” had done to Sunnis, irrespective of whether they were 
Kurdish or not. In order to suppress the rebels, Takrir-i Sukun 12 , the Law for the 
Maintenance and Order, was passed. This environment continued until the head of the 
Rebellions, Seyh Said, was arrested in late April 1925 (Zürcher 2004, 254-255). 
Therefore, Kurdish rebels were pushed to the mountains where small groups continued to 
carry out guerrilla warfare. However, these incidents resulted in another Kurdish riot that 
started in 1926 and continued for four more years thereafter. The Law for the Maintenance 
of Order enabled the Independence Tribunals13 to change the “legal face of Turkey” (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 44). Because particularly after the riots of 1920s and 1930s and 
regardless of the denominational background or the difference in political standpoints 
among the Kurdish Alevis and Kurdish Sunnis, a number of riot leaders were executed, 
while thousands of Kurdish people were deported from their homelands and forced to 
settle in Western parts of Turkey under the jurisdiction of the Takrir-i Sukun Law (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 44; Ahmad 2002, 79; Zürcher 2004, 254; Olson 1989, 125). 
When Kemalism’s point of view towards the Kurdish Alevi identity is taken into account, 
due to their identity, the Alevis were considered as members of the real Turkish version 
                                                 
12 Takrir-i Sukun – the Law for the Maintenance and Order; on March 1925, “which gave the government 
virtually absolute powers for the next two years, powers which were renewed until they were no longer 
necessary and were finally allowed to expire on 4 March 1929” (Ahmad 2002, 58, 79). 
13 Independence Tribunals were established in early 1920’s and remained in effect until 1927 in order to 
punish mainly the rioters who were against supporting the Turkish cause during the Independence War by 
any means (Zürcher 2008, 228). 
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of Islam. They were accepted as natural partners of the Kemalist laicism project (van 
Bruinessen 2013, 104). However at the same time before the 1937 Dersim incidents, a 
study carried out by the gendarme forces of the State, denoted the Kurdish Alevis as the 
Kizilbas, an expression that equates them with heretics. Furthermore, the same work 
points out that the Kizilbas committed atrocities towards the Sunnis (Gendarme General 
Command qtd. in van Bruinessen 2013, 105).  The contradiction in the State’s view 
towards Alevis, along with its view on Kurds, which regarded them as unreliable 
strangers, demonstrates that Kurdish Alevis were not perceived favorably (van Bruinessen 
2013, 104).  
In view of the previous statements, along with the Takrir-i Sukun Law, it can be observed 
that, until the introduction of this law, the Kurdish identity was ignored, suppressed and 
rejected as a separate identity. In this respect, Kurdish identity, despite being rooted and 
definable, can be perceived in parallel to the Alevi identity in terms of the recognition-
problematic caused by the governing authority over them. Thus, the Kurdish Alevi people 
were victimized twice; once by their ethnic background, and again because of the minority 
denomination that they belong to. 
3.2.2. Reforms of the Republican People’s Party 
From the beginning of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the State adopted the use 
of Kemalist ideology in every sphere in the life of the new Republic’s citizens. In order to 
draw them close to the government’s position and to instill a tendency towards modernity 
at every possible opportunity, Kemalist reforms were put into action and carried a weight 
of importance. Religion was certainly one of the foremost spheres that should also have 
been addressed by the Kemalist principles. The most effective strategy, in this regard, was 
to place religion under control in every possible way. Thus, the Turkish model of 
secularism represented particularly radical institutional changes. The enforcement of a 
Westernized dress code for public servants was one of the most visible implementations 
of this ideology. At the executive and legislative levels, the abolishment of the Caliphate 
office and the Sultanate; and the replacement of the Ministry of Shariah Affairs with the 
newly established the Presidency of Religious Affairs, represented major steps taken 
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towards secularization. Both developments greatly impacted the course of events in 
relation to the Alevis sociopolitical stand point. 
3.2.2.1. Abolishment of the Caliphate 
For the Kemalists, the abolishment of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924, right after the 
establishment of the new state - the Republic of Turkey, was one of the most important 
ways of avoiding the effect of Ottoman traditions, along with the role of the Ulema, over 
the new Republic (Ernst 2004, 121,132-133; Karasipahi 2009, 14). The Kemalists viewed 
the Ulema as ignorant charlatans rather than sources of ancient wisdom, namely because 
the Ulema rejected any benefits brought about by the development of Western science and 
technology. In contrast, the Kemalists were strongly opposed to the dogmatism of religion 
and consequently came into direct confrontation with the institutionalized effects of the 
Ottoman interpretation of religion. Furthermore, the Kemalists also regarded the Ulema 
as an obstacle to progress (Karasipahi 2009, 14; Piscatori 1986, 8, 17-18). On the decision 
to abolish the caliphate, Mustafa Kemal (SD 3: 1924b, 74 qtd. in Parla & Davidson 2004, 
115) stated: 
“The decisions made by the Assembly in the past [few] days are matters that 
have already been wished for by the nation in a natural and true way. There 
is no reason for considering these as being extraordinary. The nation desired 
there with its manner of attitude and in a natural way. And no other 
inclination could have been expected from a nation that has decided for true 
salvation and liberation”.  
Mustafa Kemal had also pointed out the opponents of his regime, whom he targeted as the 
proponents of Shariah law. Moreover, he underlined the necessity of regime change and 
made it clear for his opponents that their efforts to revert the new order to the old Ottoman 
one would never be successful: 
“There was a groundless fear, there was anxiety; the scene seen by all upon 
the proclamation of the Republic and [upon] the abolition of the institutions 
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made redundant by the requirements of the former have caused a relief in the 
hears of those fearful and anxious persons. 
From now on only one thing can come to mind. And that is that some base 
politicians and egoistical self-seekers may reawaken that fear and fancy for 
satisfying their ambitions and interests. I assure you and assure you with all 
my being that such [people] shall not be able to escape from being a target for 
the Turkish nation’s merciless annihilation the moment they insinuate their 
presence in any form, manner and occasion”. (SD 3: 1924a, 75-56 qtd. in Parla 
& Davidson 2004, 115) 
In addition, Mustafa Kemal also claimed that religion could find a space for itself in the 
new state by enjoying its full autonomy “From now on Turkey is far above being a stage 
for games of religion and Shariah. If there are such players, let them search for a stage 
elsewhere” (SD 3: 1924a, 75-56 qtd. in Parla & Davidson 2004, 115). 
Although Islam was adopted as the state religion in the new Constitution of 1924, it is also 
important to emphasize the attitude of Mustafa Kemal on the religious authorities that 
were part of the anti-laicist and anti-Kemalists groupings. The stance of Mustafa Kemal 
and his supporters was strong in terms of yielding no space for the politicization of Islam, 
in order to rescue it from the position of becoming a political instrument (Ahmad 2002, 
54).  Nevertheless, in his Izmir speech in 1923, Mustafa Kemal mentioned the unification 
of the educational system in accordance with Kemalist laicism; he could not object to 
those opposition groups. Thus, laicist reforms were brought about with “religiously 
conceived meanings” (Ernst 2004, 131; Parla & Davidson 2004, 111-112). The following 
speech given by Mustafa Kemal demonstrated his commitment to a strategy of including 
his opponents in the adoption of Kemalist policies:  
“The Turkish nation should be more religious; that is, it should be more 
religious in its whole plainness. I believe in this in the same way that I believe 
in my religion, truth itself. [Our religion] contains nothing that impedes 
progress”. (SD 3: 1923b, 70 qtd. in Parla & Davidson 2004, 114) 
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The Kemalists’ attitude towards the relationship between politics and religion, where 
religion as a concept should remain clear from the games of politics, lasted only until 
1928. In that year, the Republican People’s Party found enough strength, given the 
successful and rigid nation-state building strategies of the previous five years, to withdraw 
the statement of ‘Islam to be the religion of state’ from the constitution of 1924 (Parla & 
Davidson 2004, 106). Furthermore, removing Islam from its status as the official state 
religion from the constitution in 1928 should also be read as an attempt of the Turkification 
of Islam, rather than the separation of the Turkish state from Islam. 
Nevertheless, there is one striking point that should be emphasized here. The relationship 
between the office of the Caliphate to the Westphalia14 concept of the state came with the 
abolishment of the Caliphate office in Turkey. With the establishment of a new state under 
the laic Kemalist principles, the Republic of Turkey not only discounted the significance 
of the Caliphate office, but also established a Westphalian form of state that left no space 
for the inclusion of Islamic doctrine (Abbas 2011, 93). Having the title of Caliphate, the 
Ottoman Sultans, with the power that they gained from the Ottoman Empire, were in 
charge of the protection of all Muslims, the ultimate owner of the Ummah mission and 
had the support of all its followers. Thus, these points inherently emphasized the secular 
Turkish identity over any other affiliation, particularly religious, whether that could add 
any value to the new Republic or not.  Therefore, along with Kemalist ideology, it is 
observed that the abolishment of the Caliphate was a necessity to fulfill the requirements 
that Kemalist laicism stipulated.  
However, abolishment of the Caliphate office should not be seen as an attempt to 
completely cut off religious ties. In contrast, this occasion should be interpreted as a vital 
Kemalist ideological principle, not only to eject significant Ottoman political and cultural 
                                                 
14 The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is known as the agreement that ended the Thirty Years War (1618-
1648) between the major European powers. But more importantly it “gave a formal expression to the 
definitive replacement of medieval Christendom by independent and secular nation-states …” (Piscatori 
1986, 50). The concept of ‘nation-state’athat the Treaty of Westphalia gave birth to, is a concept still 
utilized today and defines the state system that we live in. In addition to geographical certainty, the 
Westphalian form of state brought about a sovereign state understanding. This modern state-system also 
requires, as well as stems from, the equal recognition of the sovereignty of other states. Nation-state 
sovereignty is the foremost feature of states subscribing to the Westphalian state concept (Lansford 2000, 
8).  
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heritage, but more importantly to have full control over religion as well as the ability to 
shape it according to the needs of the new Republic. Moreover with the transformation 
from a Muslim empire to adopting Western nation-statehood, the Republic of Turkey 
differs from other Muslim-majority countries; due to the fact that after the abolishment of 
the Caliphate office, the subsequent declaration of ten different Caliphs by Middle Eastern 
countries signified that Islam was being used as a tool manipulated for instrumental 
political purposes (Ernst 2004, 121, 132-133; Parla & Davidson 2004, 91).  
Thus, in this case, it is important to realize that although there may seem to be no direct 
relation between the abolishment of the Caliphate office and the Alevis, if the case of 
Kemalist laicism which elevated the Alevi traditions is taken into consideration, we can 
see that through the abolishment of Caliphate office, the Alevis were more or less 
guaranteed a more neutral environment because the biggest source of brutality of the 
Caliphate towards the Alevis, having lasted for centuries, suddenly lost its power. Also, 
the Sunni Muslims no longer had any authority upon which to legally oppress the Alevis 
as heretics. Furthermore, within this new, less oppressed environment, the Alevis were 
given the chance to participate in political and social arenas, instead of keeping themselves 
isolated in their own communities as they had been since the sixteenth century. 
3.2.2.2. Establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs – Diyanet 
Although there may be a degree of difference among the periods in the Republic between 
the Kemalist understanding of controlling religion and the preceding Ottoman position, 
there is a structural continuity among these periods: religion was taught, administered, and 
promoted by the State (Parla & Davidson 2008, 66). Thus, demolishing the Ministry of 
Shariah Affairs in 1924 in order to avoid affiliation to the Ottoman Empire in the new 
Republic era created a sizable void in the lives of Sunni followers of the new Republic. 
As Göle states, “institutions come with their significance”, so, on 3 March 1924 the 
Ministry of Shariah Affairs of the Ottoman Empire was replaced with a new Kemalist 
invention, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, Diyanet (Göle 2002, 176; Tuğal 2006, 250; 
Parla & Davidson 2004, 111-112). 
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Kemalist policies, which had started to permeate through public life from the early 1920s, 
eventually enabled the control of mainstream religion, Sunni Islam. Kemalist discourse 
stated that institutions were not to be regarded as external to social imaginaries and social 
practices (Göle 2002). As one of the most efficient and well-functioning governmental 
institutions of Turkey at that time, the Diyanet was an important as well as the most 
practical strategy for the Kemalists in the nation-building process. The Diyanet not only 
derived its religious strength from the previous Ministry of Shariah Affairs of the Ottoman 
Empire, but it also used this power to take advantage of its position in order to build a 
nation by making use of it for the new laic Turkey. In other words, the Diyanet was 
founded in order to control religious activities and solve problems related to religion in 
the domestic realm, and to transfer the population’s ties from Islam to the Turkish 
nationalist cause (Çıtak 2009, 5; Tuğal 2006, 250; Parla & Davidson 2004, 107).  
In addition, the head of Diyanet was to be appointed by the President of Turkey, “on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister” (Law on the Abolition of the Ministry of Shariah 
and Foundations and the Ministry of General Staff, Article 4 qtd. in Parla & Davidson 
2004, 111-112). Therefore, it would be a natural outcome for large Kemalist support to be 
given to the Diyanet from its establishment. 
The population of Turkey, after taking into consideration the deportation of Armenians 
and the population exchange between Turkey and Greece, consisted largely of a Muslim 
majority (Zürcher 2004, 175). However, despite this, there were significant dissimilarities 
in the religious practices amongst the Muslim groups, mainly between the Sunni and Alevi 
groups. The Kemalist position also happened to be another, distinct religious standpoint 
amongst all the different groups. The Kemalists made true Sunni-Islam second-in-
command, after nationalism, within the Kemalist identity (Çıtak 2009, 5; Parla & 
Davidson 2008, 71). 
In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal brought about the Kemalist standpoint in Islam by stating the 
necessity for a purification of Islam: “It should be purified and raised from the political 
situation in which it has been put for centuries” (Parla 2008, 108). So, the Kemalist 
interpretation of Islam, that is Turkified Islam, required finding a common tie to all the 
Turkish people in order to lift the Turkish national identity (Parla & Davidson 2004, 107). 
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Furthermore, the Kemalists also believed that state-controlled religion should be purified 
through suppressing its strong local forms, and then use this purified form of religion 
together with Alevi traditions in order to promote a uniformed Turkish identity as the new 
common bond (Massicard 2003, 46; Akan 2003, 70-71). So, the establishment of the 
Diyanet was set not only to purify Islam and control it, particularly from intervening in 
the new Turkish political arena, but also to be used as a tool for nation building which was 
a highly politicized aim in itself. 
Culture refers to the character of a historical community; nationality is seen as a heritage 
much like religion is, despite the fact that it is unconsciously constructed (Akan 2003, 61; 
Peter Jones qtd. in Akan 2003, 65). Thus, Atatürk’s statement, “religion is ‘culture’”, 
stresses that too; even though the state gave religion its own sphere through a strong 
governmental institution, the Diyanet, getting rid of religion altogether was never the 
absolute aim. Instead, the objective was to back the nation-building reforms through the 
combined use of Turkified Islam and Alevi traditions.  
The Alevis were not put forward with their religious background in nation-building 
reforms; their religious affiliation was in fact ignored in the reforms. Thus, this can be 
seen as a trap that most Alevis intentionally fell into in the new Republican era. Being 
embraced by the new Republicans did not mean that Alevis and Alevi identity were 
completely accepted; certain features were used only for Kemalist modernity and 
progression plans. In this respect, the secularist tendency among the Alevis for the sake 
of building a strong nation, which was imposed by the government, should also be seen 
as the point where the Alevis consciously accepted the passivity of their belief system as 
opposed to their culture. Culture is open to fluctuation and can be reshaped over time. 
This should be seen as natural because culture can be consciously mobilized and 
politicized, as it was in the case of Alevi culture in the new Republican Era (Akan 2003, 
65). 
In addition to the Diyanet, the declaration of the laic state with the 1937 Constitution 
ensured that the state guaranteed the absolute control of the religious institutions 
(Massicard 2003, 46). The 1937 Constitution declared its secularity through Article 2: 
‘The Turkish State is a Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist, and 
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Revolutionary-Reformist’ (Ahmad 2002, 63; Göle 1997, 49). It is important to highlight 
that Kemalism ignored religious plurality. However, despite the fact that the Diyanet was 
brought about to control the religious affairs by placing emphasis only on Sunni Islam, it 
principally elevated Sunni Islam to the status of a default religion of the State (Göle 1997, 
49; Parla & Davidson 2008, 71). In other words, Kemalism created the sphere for religion, 
embodied it with the Diyanet, and by nesting it under the most respectable institution of 
the Republic, the Presidency resulted in having an implicit state religion. Thus, Turkish 
laicism did not treat all existing religions within the Turkish borders equally. Alevism, in 
that respect, was marginalized together with other minority sects of Islam and religions in 
Turkey. Remaining as the state religion, ‘Sunni Islam’ is a concept still being challenged 
today by the Alevis (Göle 1997, 49). 
Moreover a famous and widespread saying in Turkey, which states that “laicism does not 
mean having no religion”, firmly supports the view that the Kemalist interpretation of 
laicism grasps religion (Parla & Davidson 2008, 71). Kemalism constructed itself around 
religion not against it; due to the needs of the state and its population's relationship to 
religion, laicism does not reject religion even if it solely holds Kemalists’ stand-point. The 
“Kemalists did not coexist with [a] politically and morally privileged religion”, and was 
also “the proponents, defenders, functionaries, and ideologues of a certain form of 
religious belief”, which was Sunni Islam (Parla & Davidson 2008, 71).  
Thus, according to their modernization project, even though the major aim of the 
Kemalists was to control religion by institutionalizing it through the Diyanet. However, 
in time it turned into an institution that only represented and served the interests of Sunni 
Islam. The existence of the Diyanet assured the position of Sunni Islam as the state 
religion, which stands in contradiction with the initial reasons of having a laic state. Most 
of the Alevis felt betrayed by the Republican People’s Party because the Party was seen 
to be acting hand in hand with the Alevi community during the early new nation-building 
period, only to dismiss and ignore them after establishing clear authority in the new state. 
This situation caused unrest among the Alevis in the early days of Diyanet because for 
them, the laicism principle of Kemalism failed to provide the neutral environment it 
promised. 
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Chapter IV. Multi-Party Era 
4.1. Transition to Multi-Party Era 
Detailed analyses of this period are necessary to fully understand to what extent the multi-
party transition was successful and representative of the majority of the country, 
particularly when the Alevi sectarian minority is considered. For this purpose, in this 
section the aim will be to place emphasis on the development of the political party 
structures and the reliability of newly emerged partisanship in Turkey. Furthermore, in 
order to clarify the strong connections between the newly emerged parties of the multi-
party era and the Republican People’s Party, special attention will be given to the 
Democrat Party among other parties. Accordingly, Alevi responses and reactions to the 
new parties, specifically to the Democrat Party, will be evaluated simultaneously. 
Transition to the multi-party system from the long reign of the Republican People’s Party 
is one of the cornerstones of the political history of Turkey. This transition period was 
significant, because having a multi-party system is seen as a key requirement for a 
successful democratic Turkey, especially due to it having inherited an empire with a 
religiously and ethnically non-homogenous society. It is important to recognize that the 
transition from a one party system to a multi-party system with the introduction of the 
Democrat Party was exceptional, since this transition did not cause a rupture in Turkish 
politics despite the fact that it brought an end to over twenty year of one party rule 
(Özbudun 2003, 19-20). Yet, given the attempts of the opponents of the Republican People 
Party in trying to form an opposition party before the emergence of the Democrat Party, 
their oppositional voices were not welcomed by the Republican People’s Party. Socialist 
parties, such as the Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants Party, Turkish Socialist Party 
and some other Islamist parties were not allowed by the Republicans to participate exist 
in the new so-called democratic political arena. So in effect, the transition to a multi-party 
system was still a heavily regulated process, and not as radical as it could have been. The 
Republican People's Party then maintained a tight grip on how the incorporation of a 
“multi-party” system was to develop within Turkey.  
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After some failed party building attempts, multi-partisanism recommenced in 1945 with 
the introduction of the National Development Party led by Nuri Demirağ. However, the 
National Development Party was not particularly influential. Still, this transition, created 
a suitable environment for building an opposition party; and this was the brainchild of the 
then-President and leader of the Republican People’s Party, İsmet İnönü (Hiç 2009, 15-
17; Özbudun 2003, 19-20). Thus in 1946, with the full support of the Republican People’s 
Party, Celal Bayar, a former Republican, established the Democrat Party. With the support 
of the Republican People’s Party for the creation of an opposition party, the Democrat 
Party, can also be traced back to the initial ideological commonality of both parties. The 
slight difference between the parties related chiefly to the parties’ politics; the Republican 
People’s Party comprised an elite group of politicians that tended to follow more the 
national-based interests of both the military and the state, while on the other hand, the 
Democrat Party consisted of a political elite that focused on focused local and regional 
demands (Hiç 2009, 16-17; Özbudun 2003, 35). Furthermore, the lack of a demand by the 
Democrat Party for a change in the constitution is another sign that the party was 
established under the full control of the Republicans (Hiç 2009, 16; Özbudun 2003, 23), 
and was symptomatic of the Republican interest in maintaining control over the 
democratic processes within Turkey15. 
There were also three conditions, stipulated by President İnönü that the new parties had 
to obey: the secular character of the country would not be changed, foreign affairs would 
be advanced, and primary school education would be encouraged (Özbudun 2003, 21). 
Yet the main emphasis was put on the protection of the new democratic feature of the 
country (Hiç 2009, 16-17; Özbudun 2003, 22). 
The first real elections in the history of Republic of Turkey took place in 1946. The 
Democrat Party won 66 seats, the Republican People’s Party won 396 seats and 
                                                 
15 Even though more recent literature on this topic has criticized the “official” version of history presented 
by the Kemalist regime during this period (Dressler 2013; Houston 2008), the view presented here, that 
the Democrat Party and the Republican People’s Party were in effect a concerted effort, two sides of the 
same coin as it were, is not at odds with this critical approach to the history of the period. What is 
important to the thesis is how the Alevi, as the targets of this apparently dualistic approach to policy, were 
motivated to move in their allegiance from one Kemalist ideological position to another. Özbudun and 
Hiç’s presentation of the history, in this respect, serves to highlight the popular reception of this “split” in 
Kemalism during the period. 
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independents won 7 seats (Hiç 2009, 17-18; Özbudun 2003, 21). The second multiparty 
elections took place in 1950. This election concluded with the great success of the 
Democrat party; the Democrat Party won 470 seats, while the Republican People’s Party 
could only amass 69 seats. This achievement of the Democrat Party was the sign that 
guaranteed the Democrat Party’s place in Turkish politics, even though the result surprised 
not only the Republicans but also the Democrat Party and its supporters. In the following 
elections of 1954 and 1957, the Democrat Party won more seats again and also won the 
majority of the seats in parliament, although the Democrat Party did lose some of its 
support in latter elections. Nonetheless on May 27, 1960 the first democratic experience 
of Turkey (1946 – 1960) was brought to an abrupt end by a Coup d’état (Belge 2013; Hiç 
2009, 17-18; Özbudun 2003, 35). 
In the following section, the development of the political party structures and reliability 
of the newly emerged partisanship in Turkey will be examined.  
4.1.1. Party Structure and Partisanship 
According to Frederick Frey, Turkish politics of the 1950s should be considered as the 
politics of the new political parties. The political parties of the era were highly 
institutionalized even though they were new. They were strong and broad, and remained 
having unofficial but direct attachments to the larger Turkish society up until the 1970s 
(Frey 1965, 78-81). After the 1970s, the party system fragmentized. The number of the 
political parties’ increased, ideological polarization became crucial and society became 
reluctant in identifying itself through any of the given parties (Hiç 2009, 22; Özbudun 
2003, 69-71). All in all, compared to 1950s, the 1970s showed an institutional collapse of 
political parties. 
Starting from one-party rule until the 1970s, party membership was considered to be the 
most important indicator of the political parties’ strength. In 1930, the Republican 
People’s Party had 800,000 members, consisting of 5 per cent of the general population 
of Turkey. This number increased to 1,059,000 members in 1933, comprising 7 per cent 
of the population and in 1941, 1,512,719 members were registered as the Republican 
People’s Party members. In 1948, two years after the Democrat Party was established, 
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almost 1.9 million people, i.e. 9.5 per cent of the population, were members of the 
Republican People’s Party (Öz 1992, 182). In addition, Turkish youth below voting age 
were incorporated by Kemalists as natural members of the Republican People’s Party 
(Schuler 2002, 43). Within a year following its establishment, the Democrat Party also 
followed the trend and the number of Democrat Party members reached 1 million (Schuler 
2002, 52). 
The degree of organization in the Republican Party in 1948, was akin to that of the Nazi 
Party, having surprisingly resulted in 6.5 million registered party members in 1943 (Öz 
1992, 182). Under these circumstances, there are two possible reasons that have emerged 
to explain the overstated member of the Republican People’s Party. The first possible 
reason can be the use of disorganized and miscalculated party lists. The second and more 
likely possibility is that the overstated number of party members can only be propaganda-
oriented, which can be seen as a reflection of the strong Kemalist foundation at the public 
level (Schuler 2002, 42). 
Contrary to the growth of membership, while the Republican People’s Party 
administration of the 1930s was completely supportive of rapid growth, they were also 
unwilling to include the whole nation in their organization. The administrative body had 
a precise idea who should become a member and who shouldn’t because they believed the 
threat against Kemalist reforms were likely to develop from receiving uncontrolled 
membership from all parts of society (Schuler 2002, 47). With regard to this, while Alevis 
were supported to become members, mürteci, or reactionists were certainly not welcomed 
even though it was known that many mürtecis had already been admitted into the party. 
In addition to the mürtecis, Kemalist member enlargement was directed through a Turkish 
nationalism that indirectly and clearly reflected the period between 1936 and 1941. There 
was a conscious deferment of the Kemalist administration in their politics of membership 
enlargement in South Eastern Turkey, where the Kurdish population density is higher than 
other parts of the country (Schuler 2002, 48-50). The Kurdish rebellions (1924 – 1938) 
could be seen as the major reason for the party politics of enlarging partisanship in that 
region, since the rejection of being a member was popular in the region and did not seem 
feasible, particularly to the Kurdish Alevis, as the Kemalists' displayed heavy disapproval 
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of the rebellions (Zürcher 2004, 254-255; van Bruinessen 2013, 33, 70, 103; Schuler 2002, 
50-51). 
Considering the Democrat Party’s viewpoint in relation to expanding their party members, 
we can observe a similar reluctance of the Republican People’s Party’s administration to 
regard the Kurdish people (Schuler 2002, 52-53). The main reason for the aforementioned 
similarity is because the Democrat Party was born from the womb of Republican People’s 
Party, and in its first years it especially followed an ideology parallel to that of the 
Republican People’s Party with regards to party-strengthening strategies (Schuler 2002, 
53). Nevertheless, in a short period of time the Democrat Party emerged as the broad 
populist party that aimed to be critical of the Republican state’s grasp of a solid 
homogenized social identity (Hiç 2009, 17; Özbudun 2003, 78). 
Factionalism in the country had always blighted Anatolia. This formation of the country 
thus favoured the Democrat Party, so when the coast was seen as supporting the 
Republican People’s Party, it fell on Anatolia, in view of propaganda strategies by the 
Democrat leadership, to support the Democrat Party. It is important to note that the 
Democrat Party not only had the opportunity to get ready votes due to factionalism, but 
also factionalism in the country underlined the existence of a social heterogeneous 
opposition to the Republican People’s Party (Hiç 2009, 16-17; Özbudun 2003, 78). The 
high numbers of registered party members of both parties also highlighted the polarized 
political standpoint of society (Schuler 2002, 53). 
During 1950s, the politics of Turkey were shaped in the midst of partisanship-
strengthening policies of the political parties, which in time with the existing fragmented 
society turned into polarizing policies. The Republican People’s Party supported Alevi 
partisanship, while the Party remained distant to enlarging its party membership to the 
Kurdish, particularly Sunni, populace. With the number of the party members of the 
Republican People’s Party in mind as the reflection of the strong Kemalist basis at the 
public level, the special interest of the Kemalists in the Alevis is what ultimately 
underlined the Alevi support of Kemalism. Furthermore, in the wake of the emergent party 
politics of the era, the Alevi community increasingly became modeled and interpreted as 
a distinct and homogenous political community, not only from the official view of the 
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political parties that sought their support but also from within the community that sought 
representation by aligning with political parties, and represented a support. 
4.2. The Democrat Party 
After the incentive of 1945, on 7 January 1946, the Democrat Party was officially 
established under the leadership of Celal Bayar (Özbudun 2003, 21). As aforementioned, 
being able to gain a good number of Parliamentary seats through the first election in 1950 
was an important indicator for the future successes of the Party. The conditions for the 
success of the young Democrat Party can be grouped together under three interlinked 
reasons. 
The first reason is that the long reign of the Republican People’s Party did not represent 
the majority of the society. In addition, people under strict Kemalist rule, particularly in 
relation to its restrictive policies towards religion, gave rise to obvious separations of 
certain groups; e.g. laics and anti-laics. Thus, the twenty-year rule of the Kemalists 
expectedly resulted in a big vacuum that needed to be filled. State laicization through the 
abolishment of the Caliphate office (1924), the control over religion especially in the 
education system via the Diyanet (1924), the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code, the 
Italian Penal Code, and the German code (1926) to replace Shariah were not welcomed 
by most of the Sunni majority (Ahmad 2002, 80; Schuler 2002, 162).  
Secondly, particularly-ignored rural Anatolian peasantry, whose emphasis was on 
religion, were the biggest supporters of the Democrat Party (Hiç 2009, 23, 30). This rural 
group never took full advantage of the state regulated secular culture created by the 
Kemalist state. As time passed, the gap between the peasantry and elite classes widened. 
For example, inadequate education opportunities that were offered to Anatolia, compared 
to the western urban cities, are an important contributing factor which brought about this 
situation. Moreover, the rise in modern industry which was also controlled by a few large-
scale companies, severely placed pressure on small business owners across Anatolia (Hiç 
2009, 16, 23).  
 69 
The laic implementations of the Kemalists not only excluded a big part of society that had 
developed significant Islamic traditions over centuries, but also excluded the Alevis living 
in Anatolia; who also experienced the effects of social and economic deficits through this 
exclusion. These rural based Anatolian Alevis still lived in their self-enclosed 
communities, even though with the introduction of the laicization policies they had high 
expectations for neutral treatment, and tolerant acceptance, under Republican rule 
(Schuler 2002, 162). Hence, the need for a new political party that would serve as an 
opposition to the Republican People’s Party became a driving force behind the 
introduction of the Democrat Party to the region. The Democrat Party was seen as  
independent from the Republican political ideology, and was considered vital by the 
Alevis and many of the other groups who wished to maintain their distinct religious and 
ethnic identities in a secular government that would be equitable towards those ends. 
The third reason for the success of the Democrat Party stemmed from the gap that 
Kemalist rule had created over twenty years. The aforementioned efforts of people with a 
socialist or Islamist background to form a new political party were overwhelmingly denied 
by the Republicans. As a result the supporters of various different ideologies and parties 
saw this new party, the Democrat Party, as a break from the Republican People’s Party’s 
centrist, bureaucratic and authoritative policies (Keyder 1990, 101). The support of the 
illegal Communist Party’s members for the Democrat Party during the 1950 election is a 
good example in understanding the reason of unification of different voices that stemmed 
from the significance of needing an opposition to the long standing Kemalist rule (Okan 
2004, 94). Apart from the neglected position of the Alevi communities, when the 
Democratic Party's policies that were set to result in the advancement of the agricultural 
sector were considered, Alevi interest in this party increased greatly because the majority 
of Alevi people lived as farmers (Schuler 2002, 162). Therefore, during the 1950s, the 
Alevis switched their allegiance from the Republican People’s Party to the Democrat Party 
(Coşkun 1995, 266). So, it can be safely said in regards to the three aforementioned 
intermingled reasons that failure of the strategies of inclusion and other alienating efforts 
of the Republican People’s Party reflected through the ballot boxes, and as a result 
contributed to the overwhelming success of the Democrat Party. 
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The Democrat Party that became a strong governing power due to the big support that it 
gained fundamentally from the large peasantry at the time, and its rise could be 
characterized as a mass action taking place in a very short amount of time, but it too failed 
in preserving its inclusive attitude towards ethnic and religious diversity in the long run 
(Eroğul 1990, 87). Accordingly, the change in the political direction of the Alevis, which 
was a significant reason for the success of the Democrat Party during early 1950s, did not 
last long (Schuler 2002, 162). The ideological line that the Democrat Party took attracted 
more and more Sunni Muslims, who, due to long-standing historical tension between the 
two religious groups, were not welcomed by the Alevis. This is because the Alevi identity 
was fundamentally rejected by the Sunni hegemon ruling bodies from the sixteenth 
century onwards (Okan 2004, 95). Still, even though that reason cannot be seen as the sole 
reason (the other possible reasons can be found in the following paragraphs), many Alevi 
communities eventually returned back to supporting the Republican People’s Party 
(Schuler 2002, 162). In the end the Republican vision of a state regulated laicism, was 
seen as more favorable to the Alevi community than the threat of a Sunni dominated 
laicism under the Democrats. With this parallel line over religion that was drawn by the 
Republican People’s Party, from 1957 elections onwards, state regulated ‘laicism’ quickly 
became the main category that determined the Alevis’ political tendency (Kars 1990, 5; 
Okan 2004, 95). 
Unsurprisingly, chiefly with the withdrawal of Alevi support, along with other socialist 
groups’ support in the 1957 election, the Democrat Party’s vote rate began to decrease. 
Along with this circumstance, the Democrat Party’s suppression over opposition party 
members and supporters extended to a critical level. Changing the status of a city -
Kırşehir- to a district, using the state radio broadcasts solely for the interests of the 
Democrat Party and reforming parliamentary legislation in order to stop the resistance of 
opposition; were only some of the ways through which the Democrat Party implemented 
oppressive political tactics (Hiç 2009, 30; Özbudun 2003, 35). Finally, with the support 
of ever-increasing opposition groups from various groups, the army seized power over the 
Democrat Party on the 27th of May 1960 (Hiç 2009, 30; Özbudun 2003, 36). 
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At this point, apart from the aforementioned oppression strategies, it is central to evaluate 
what specifically caused Alevi communities to stop supporting the Democrat Party 
policies in order to have a better understanding of the change of Alevis’ political tendency 
in the 1950s back towards the Republican People’s Party, as well as their strengthened 
attachment to the Republican People’s Party, which have made them predominately 
staunch defenders of laicism up until today. The failures of the Democrat Party in the eyes 
of the Alevi communities can be gathered in two interconnected phases. 
The main and the most visible initial reason, as previously mentioned, was the coinciding 
objectives of the Democrat Party and the Sunni Islamic ideology, which was seen as a 
form of Islamic resurgence (Ahmad 2002, 219; Schuler 2002, 162). Mosque-building 
programs, as well as establishing Imam Hatip schools in order to gain the support of Sunni 
tariqats, caused a loss of support from the Alevi communities (Schuler 2002, 162-163). 
The Democrat Party’s sympathy for the Nur Movement, an Islamic movement that started 
in the early twentieth century, was especially seen as one of the major reasons that a 
number of Alevis withdrew their support from the Democrat Party given also that the 
Sunni Islamization of the ruling body was the biggest worry for the Alevis (Schuler 2002, 
163). The suppression they experienced for centuries under the Ottoman Empire and being 
used and also neglected as a sectarian community by the Young Turks and then later again 
by the Republican People’s Party, made them more cautious towards this issue. This 
resulted in a lack of belief for a promising future while the Democrat Party, that dismissed 
the laic values of Turkey, remained in power.  
Secondly, by putting its Sunni Islamic policies into action, the Democrat Party did not 
only signal the introduction of a more conservative environment and oppression towards 
any kind of opposition, but also by being against the progressive and laic fundamentals of 
the Kemalist Republic of Turkey, created a more polarized environment. Because of this, 
the Alevis and other minority groups, either ideological or religious or ethnic, stopped 
supporting the Democrat Party. Certain distinctions, which are still in use in present-day 
Turkey, such as the division in the society in between laic as opposed to religious, or 
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republican and leftist ideologues16 opposed to pro-Shariah reactionaries, emerged as a 
result of the exclusivist character that the Democrat Party gained during its short rule 
(Okan 2004, 97-98). This clear separation between the parties was attributed to the laic 
and republican leftist features that most appealed to the Alevi identity. In addition, 
Alevism, with its new political identity once more gave the unexpected result of locating 
the community on one of side, neglecting its religious as well as ethnic affiliations, in 
favor of a government that would better suit its existential concerns as a community. 
Consequently, in light of the points made, even though the Democrat Party achieved a 
significant amount of support from different parts of society, and appeared as a strong 
opposition against the long reign of the Republican People’s party after its first two 
elections (1950 and 1954), it failed to maintain the support of the Alevis and other socialist 
groups from the 1957 election onwards. The religious standpoint of the Democratic Party, 
privileging the Sunni Islamic tariqats in particular, caused frustration as well as unrest 
among Alevi communities, who were in search of a laic environment in which they could 
have their voice heard. All in all, starting from late 1950s, the Alevis, adopting a 
politicized identity, also increasingly committed themselves to becoming the defenders of 
the laic Republic of Turkey turning out to become their main identity definition. 
4.3. Crystallization of the Political Identity of Alevis 
The Sunni Islamic resurgence that began with the Democrat Party’s last period after the 
1954 elections has not stopped gaining momentum ever since (Ahmad 2002, 219). “In the 
1960s the conservatives, alarmed by the growing influence of socialist and democratic 
forces, began to use religion as an ideological counter-force” (Ahmad 2002, 219; Hiç 
2009, 23, 30). This situation made it clear not only to the political expediency the Alevis 
embodied, which was decidedly to the left, but also the leftist ideology in general that the 
                                                 
16 The Republican People’s Party in its early years cannot be categorized as a left wing party because 
populism arrow of the party meant that the existence of the class differences within the society was accepted. 
Nonetheless, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, abolishment of the Caliphate office with the introduction 
of secular republic resulted in characterizing the party a left-wing one (Okan 2004, 97-98). In this regard 
Alevis support for the Republican People’s Party can be interpreted as supporting a laic concept which was 
an indication of left in Turkish context. Like the majority of the socialist movements, the majority of the 
Alevis’ political stance did not present itself leftist rather statism (Ibid.). 
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adoption of these politics did not have not much to do either with their religious or ethnic 
background (Çamuroğlu 1998, 79; Köse 2012, 593; Massicard 2007, 60-61). 
In the 1950s, because of industrialization, there was increase in migration from rural to 
urban cities17. Migration also carried the party mechanisms that were formed in the rural 
areas to the big cities (Hiç 2009, 30; Özbudun 2003, 78). The effectiveness of the system 
carried on with the Justice Party after the Democrat Party was abolished by the Coup of 
1960. This situation can also be seen as the explanation for the failure to build loyal 
horizontal networks between political parties and their supporters (Özbudun 2003, 78). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the ideological polarization in society did not change the 
fundamental vertical structure of the parties, but it did however destroy the then party 
system which did not have a strong bourgeoisie, and was highly autonomous from social 
groups (Heper 1985, 100-101).  
“…Alevi expressions of communal tradition have had to contend with 
accusations of disloyalty to the nation that have been backed with threats and 
acts of violence. This fact goes some way to explaining what might otherwise 
seem to be a contradiction that, in an era of increased public reflexivity on 
communal differences and religious pluralism, many Alevis continue to insist 
upon their commitment to the indivisibility of the nation, brandishing Turkish 
flags and photographs of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at events organized for the 
sake of communal expression”. (Tambar 2012, 659) 
The rise in political Islam among Sunni Muslims gained more strength in the 1970s and 
brought about attacks on the laic order of the Republic, with the accusation of it being 
restrictive on religion. These circumstances underlined the polarized nature of the country 
to a high level. The Alevis could not create their own identity movements akin to the 
Kurds and Islamists, who depended on a reference actor for their religious and ethnic 
political stance. The absence of a reference actor for the Alevis was likely to have 
                                                 
17 The high migration rate after 1950’s in Turkey did not affect the population growth rate of rural regions 
as well as the big cities. With the end of World War II high birth rate was witnessed all around Turkey. 
Solely after 1980’s the rural depopulation caused a remarkable decrease in the population in the rural 
zones of Turkey (Schuler 2002, 85). 
 74 
stemmed from the absence in recognition of the Alevi as a distinct identity. As a result, 
their ideological tendency coming from the early Republican era located them to the leftist 
side during the movements; with the advent of modernization and urbanization, the Alevis 
went through another identity formation to a great extent (Sokefeld 2008, 32; Köse 2012, 
576; Tambar 2012, 653; Massicard 2007, 58). Thus, despite the discriminatory reforms 
experienced from the early days of the Republic of Turkey by the Kemalists, the Alevis 
to a large extent continued to provide loyal support to the Kemalist Republic (Vorhoff 
1999, 35-36; Okan 2002, 97).  
Another point to make clear is that the Alevis’ socialist path that started during the early 
Republican era later reflects their political stance of supporting leftist parties. Despite the 
1923-1946 single party era of the Republican People’s Party being contextually and 
structurally different than the 1980s Social Democratic People’s Party, the majority of the 
latter mentioned party members saw this party as the continuation of their parents’ party; 
the Republican People’s Party (Schuler 2002, 41, 157). In direct proportion to the strong 
support of the Alevis during a significant part of the grass-roots era of the Republican 
People’s Party, in parallel to the general view, the Social Democratic People’s Party also 
benefited highly from the crucial support of the Alevi communities (Schuler 2002, 41; 
Ayata 1993, 44; Erdoğan 1995, 76). 
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Chapter V. Conclusion 
The notion of Alevi identity is inherently always in contention. Whether being told orally 
by Alevis themselves, academically or by an oppressive power Alevi identity is always in 
controversy because Alevi identity is never fixed in one location of place and time; instead 
it is constantly in flux and appearing in the course of transition. Over the recent years it 
has accrued certain qualities such as secular or leftist. However, it is only through 
centuries of movement that these qualities have come into view. 
It appears that the emergence of the Alevi political identity contrary to general tendency 
was not shaped after the 1970s. Under current conditions, the question of when the 
political identity of the Alevis was born and how it evolved in time is the key issue. 
Particularly the analysis of the period in between the late Ottoman Empire and early 
Republican Era offers a viable answer to this issue. By tying the Young Turks’ interest to 
Alevis then to the Kemalists, Alevi political identity can surely be seen as having 
transformed from maintaining no clear active public politics of identity to beginning to 
have one. As it has been argued, the absence of existing political, historical, sociological 
and ethnographic literature on the topic is a clear sign of the continued neglect of the 
political aspect of Alevi identity; which Alevi communities challenge even today, as in 
the case of naming the third bridge on the Bosphorus after Yavuz Sultan Selim of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
In order to show the importance of the era that reshaped Alevi identity, by putting less 
emphasis on either a religious and ethnic affiliation, and examining both of these qualities 
as not absolute or polarized in their historical context, this study validated how this 
sectarian minority of Alevism evolved politically from the sixteenth century Ottoman 
Empire forward. Also lying the groundwork as to understanding why most Alevis became 
Kemalists during the early Republican era of modern Turkey, with only a few leaving 
Kemalism since then.  
Before the Republican People’s Party, whose roots are found in the Young Turks’ 
ideology, it is not possible to mention a politically identifiable Alevi identity. This work, 
in this respect, was essentially interested in the material historical, political and social 
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dynamics at play throughout the Alevi history in Turkey, focusing on the late Ottoman 
Empire and early Republican Era when the archival productions of an Alevis' political 
identity was mainly shaped. Concentrating on how this shaping reduced their cultural 
identity as an isolated and unique one, this study also shows how Alevism has perceived 
itself as an orthodox religion in Islam, even under dominate Sunni Islam interpretations 
that are antagonistic to this claim of orthodoxy.    
In this regard this thesis reintroduced emphasis on the history of this transition, and the 
expanding of that particular period of moving the historical understanding of the Alevis 
from a marginalized religious group to the embodiment of the Alevis as a figure for the 
new Turkishness; which Kemalism had required to create within Turkey. Furthermore, 
explicit attention has been paid to continuing the academic account of how the Alevi 
uptake of its “identification” within the discourse of these competing powers, Ottoman 
and Kemalist, has unfolded. From the view of the Alevis, the way their community and 
political interests have mobilized, has been from a paradoxical resistance to and 
embodiment of the logic of Empire and Nation, as expressed under these separate 
historical regimes.   
This thesis also attempted to focus on Kurdish and Turkish Alevis as overlooked intra-
ethnic communities. Since the political behavior between the two starting from the Seyh 
Said rebellion was observed parallel and there were certain disagreements between the 
Kurdish Sunni and Kurdish Alevis regarding the position they took in relation to the 
Kemalist laicism. This examination showed that being Alevi for Kurdish people was more 
dominant in choosing their political side than being Kurdish. 
For this purpose this study examined the reproduction of Alevi identity starting from the 
direct and indirect religious, sociological and political effects of the Ottoman Empire and 
Safavid Dynasty and their relations to the Alevi community. Relations that were informed 
by many policies and institutionalized practices and interpretations, such as the change in 
the dedelik understanding and institution of Alevi community, as well as gaining 
recognition as a religious group for the first time in the sixteenth century. Though the early 
accounts of Alevi groups were predominately prejudiced and negative, the Alevi 
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community continued to practice and re-form their own religious and communal practice 
in spite of their non-recognition as legitimate. 
In order to show the importance of the late Ottoman period, the Young Turks influence 
on the identity building of Alevis evaluated. The Young Turks’ support for Alevis 
particularly during the Tanzimat period resulted in gaining a political influence for the 
Alevis, with the Bektashis particularly highlighted. Especially because this situation 
caused a resurrection of the Alevi community under the Kemalist Republican People’s 
Party rule, during the Early Republican era, casting them as a key nation building actor. 
The analysis of the Early Republican era showed that even though Kemalists’ Turkishness 
leaned on laicism. It still made use of the history and traditions of Alevis in ways that were 
rediscovered and re-manufactured by the Kemalists, and was not welcomed by the 
majority of Alevis. This is chiefly because this effort by the Kemalists ultimately lacked 
the ability, from the point of view of the Alevi themselves, to create a neutral environment 
for the Alevis to represent themselves. In order to show the main reasons of Alevi 
frustration, the two main reforms of the Kemalist ideology have been examined; the 
abolishment of the Caliphate office and establishment of the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs. This examination showed that even though first reform resulted in a great extent 
of control of the Sunni Islamic dominancy within Turkey, the second reform, despite it 
being put into action to restrict the role of religion in public sphere, brought about the 
Sunni religion as the defacto official state religion. In doing this also showed that Kemalist 
laicism ultimately rejected religious pluralism. 
The significance of the multi-party era for the Alevi communities appears precisely at this 
point.  Because of the non-acknowledgment of the identification of being Alevi under the 
Republican People’s Party for more than twenty years, Alevis supported the first 
successful political party that emerged in this period, the Democrat Party. Yet, the newly 
forged Democrat Party failed to maintain its support from the Alevis after the 1957 
election, because the religious stance of the party privileged Sunni Islam in particular. 
This situation caused unrest among Alevi communities, who were in search of a laic 
political environment, in which they would be treated as equal with the Sunni majority. 
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To sum up, starting from late 1950s, the shift in the political tendency of Alevis made its 
solidified and ultimate move towards the laic and socialist Republican People’s Party. 
This shift also underlined the Alevis adoption of a politicized identity, in which they 
committed themselves to becoming the defenders of a laic Republic of Turkey; which has 
subsequently turned out to become their main identity definition. 
With the help of the course of a number of theoretical paths that have crossed; such as the 
problem of history-making and voice within the official production of an archive against 
a long standing oral history, the clash of the private and public when marginalized 
heterodox religious/ethnic communities confront hegemonic political/religious powers, 
and the development of a strong partisanship structure in politics which does not provide 
full articulation to a people's political needs and will. This thesis shows how contemporary 
Alevi identity is historically tied to the effect of the ebb and flow between these various 
institutional and internal effects of a marginalized community's existence. 
This research offers then a call to open up further discussion of the period between the 
two distinct positions that have been taken in existing literature. While one position 
heavily focused on the pre-Republic Alevi identity, and the other has stressed the political 
nature of Alevism after the 1970s’; the main focus in this regard is on the ‘transition’ of 
the Alevi identity from a religious/ethnic community to secularist political demographic 
and community.   
Further research based on the framework of this thesis could help to develop a literature 
that recognizes the transition period of political, social and cultural identity of Alevis that 
started in the fourteenth century and leads into the Early Republican Era of Modern 
Turkey. This literature would facilitate solving the existing identity problematic that the 
Alevis face in Turkey to this day, as well as better contextualize why issues like the third 
bridge of the Bosphorus the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge are problematic within 
contemporary Turkey's sanctioned national discourse. 
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